United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CRITES-LEONI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Defendant/Counterclaim
Plaintiff Bancservices International, LLC's
(“BSI”) “Motion to Reconsider the
Court's December 6, 2019 Memorandum and Order as it
Relates to Counterclaims and Request for Oral
Argument.” (Doc. 34.)
Complaint, Plaintiff Dinosaur Merchant Bank Limited
(“Dinosaur”) asserted claims of breach of
contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and
conversion based on BSI's withholding of $3, 469, 718.26
of funds from a failed transaction
(“Transaction”). The Transaction was initiated
under an International Payment Services Agreement
(“IPSA”) executed between the parties. BSI filed
a Counterclaim, in which it asserted claims of fraud, breach
of contract, and indemnity related to the Transaction.
December 6, 2019, Memorandum and Order, the Court granted
Dinosaur's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The
Court held that BSI was in breach of the IPSA for retaining
the $3, 469, 718.26. The Court further found that BSI failed
to state a claim for fraud, breach of contract, or indemnity.
requests that the Court reconsider the Memorandum and Order
with respect to BSI's Counterclaim for fraud and
indemnity. Dinosaur has filed a Response in
opposition to BSI's Motion (Doc. 37), and BSI has filed a
Reply (Doc. 40).
for reconsideration are not explicitly mentioned in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. First Health
Group Corp., No. 4:07-CV-1852, 2009 WL 1940373, at *1
(E.D. Mo. July 7, 2009). According to the Eighth Circuit, a
“motion for reconsideration” is typically
construed either as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a
judgment or a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a judgment.
Auto Services Co. v. KPMG, L.L.P., 537 F .3d 853,
855 (8th Cir. 2008). Both Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) require
that any judgment or order being reconsidered be a final
judgment or order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), 60(b); Disc.
Tobacco Warehouse, Inc. v. Briggs Tobacco and Specialty
Co., No. 3:09-CV-5078, 2010 WL 3522476, at *1 (W.D. Mo.
Sept. 2, 2010). The rules prescribe a similar standard in
that a district court has wide discretion in deciding whether
to grant a Rule 59(e) or 60(b) motion, so long as manifest
errors of law or fact, or exceptional circumstances (such as
newly discovered evidence that was not available at the time
the order was given) exist. See Arnold v. ADT Sec.
Servs., 627 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing
Rule 60(b)); see also Disc. Tobacco, 2010 WL
3522476, at *1 (discussing Rules 59(e), 60(b)).
an interlocutory order “may be revised at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and
all the parties' rights and liabilities.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Reconsideration may be granted if the
earlier decision (1) misunderstood a party, (2) made a
decision outside of the adversarial issues, or (3) would be
rendered incorrect because of a “controlling or
significant change in law” since the issues were
submitted to the Court. Westinghouse Electric Co. v.
United States, No. 4:03-CV-861, 2009 WL 881605, at *4
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2009). Moreover, when evaluating whether
to grant a motion to reconsider, the Court also has an
interest in judicial economy and ensuring respect for the
finality of its decisions, values which would be undermined
if it were to routinely reconsider its interlocutory orders.
Disc. Tobacco, 2010 WL 3522476, at *2.
Motion to Reconsider
previously noted, BSI only challenges the Court's
dismissal of BSI's counterclaims for fraud and indemnity.
argues that the Court “mistakenly considered the
presence of De Jesus and De Jesus as the alleged fraudulent
misrepresentation when, in fact, it was the nondisclosure of
an entirely different escrow agent that formed the basis of
BSI's claim for fraud.” (Doc. 35 at p. 2.)
Specifically, BSI contends that “it was Dinosaur's
fraudulent nondisclosure of a wholly separate escrow agent,
the Pennings Foundation, that formed the basis for BSI's
fraud claim.” Id. BSI filed the instant Motion
to “clarify to the Court that the disclosure of De
Jesus and De Jesus does not defeat BSI's counterclaim
because the counterclaim for fraud alleges that Dinosaur
fraudulently failed to disclose the identity of the true
court-appointed escrow agent, an entity that was not De Jesus
and Je Jesus.” Id. at p. 3. BSI argues that
Dinosaur's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should
have been denied with respect to BSI's fraud claim and
its related indemnity claim. In the alternative, BSI requests
leave to amend its Counterclaim to state its claim for fraud
and indemnity with more particularity “related to the
nondisclosure of the true court-appointed escrow agent for
the transaction.” Id. at 6.
responds that the Motion for Reconsideration should be denied
because BSI points to nothing that the Court misapprehended
or that would constitute newly discovered evidence. Dinosaur
contends that the Counterclaim does not allege that Dinosaur
knew at the time of the payment orders the identity of a
court-appointed escrow agent or that Dinosaur asserted that
De Jesus & De Jesus was a “court-appointed escrow
agent.” With regard to BSI's alternative request to
amend its Counterclaim, Dinosaur ...