United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CATHERINE D. PERRY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on movant Reuben Stewart's
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Docket No. 1). The motion appears to
be time-barred. Therefore, for the reasons discussed below,
the Court will order movant to show cause why the motion
should not be summarily dismissed.
14, 2016, movant pled guilty to three counts: felon in
possession of a firearm; possession of heroin; and possession
of cocaine base. United States v. Stewart, No.
4:16-cr-125-CDP-1 (E.D. Mo.). On December 15, 2016, he was
sentenced to a total term of 180 months' imprisonment.
Thereafter, movant filed a direct appeal. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
Court's judgment on February 21, 2018. United States
v. Stewart, 711 Fed.Appx. 810, 812 (8th Cir.
2018). Movant subsequently filed a petition for writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The petition
was denied on October 29, 2018. Stewart v. United
States, 139 S.Ct. 415 (2018). Movant filed the instant
motion on November 27, 2019, by placing it in his
prison's mailing system. (Docket No. 1 at 12).
motion, movant states two grounds for relief. First, he
asserts that his counsel was ineffective for advising him to
enter a guilty plea. (Docket No. 1 at 4). Second, he states
that he is actually innocent of Count I, being a felon in
possession of a firearm, after the decision in Rehaif v.
United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). (Docket No. 1 at
is a pro se litigant currently incarcerated at the Oxford
Federal Correctional Institution in Oxford, Wisconsin. He
brings this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the
reasons discussed below, the motion appears to be untimely,
and movant will be directed to show cause why it should not
be denied and dismissed.
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are subject to a
one-year limitations period. Peden v. United States,
914 F.3d 1151, 1152 (8th Cir. 2019). The
limitations period runs from the latest of four dates:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). In practice, however, the one-year
statute of limitations “usually means that a prisoner
must file a motion within one year of the date on which the
judgment of conviction becomes final.” Mora-Higuera
v. United States, 914 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th
Cir. 2019). When a movant has filed a petition for writ of
certiorari, the denial of such petition by the United States
Supreme Court fixes the point of finality for his or her
conviction. See United States v. McIntosh, 332 F.3d
550, 550 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining that
movant's “conviction became final upon completion
of direct review when the Supreme Court denied
certiorari…and he had one year from that date to file
his section 2255 motion”); and Sweet v. Delo,