United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff
LaKentae Roberson for leave to commence this civil action
without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No.
2). Having reviewed the motion and the financial information
submitted in support, the Court has determined that plaintiff
lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will
assess an initial partial filing fee of $18.52. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Additionally, for the reasons
discussed below, plaintiff will be directed to file an
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil
action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount
of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in
his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court
must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average
monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the
average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the
prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial
filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments
of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to
the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The
agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these
monthly payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the
amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10.00, until
the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
support of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, plaintiff
submitted a certified inmate account statement. (Docket No.
4-1). The certified inmate account statement shows an average
monthly deposit of $92.60. The Court will therefore assess an
initial partial filing fee of $18.52, which is 20 percent of
plaintiff's average monthly deposit.
Standard on Initial Review
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss
a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,
which is more than a “mere possibility of
misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense.
Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the
facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber,
820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also
Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73
(8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept
factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required
to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a
reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the
Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A
“liberal construction” means that if the essence
of an allegation is discernible, the district court should
construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits
his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787
(8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints
are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim
for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon,
623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8thCir.
2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to
“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an
additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger
complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint
the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that
procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508
U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
is currently incarcerated at the St. Louis County Justice
Center in Clayton, Missouri. He brings this action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the Velda City Police
Department and Officer Matt Reppy as defendants. Officer
Reppy is sued in his official capacity only. (Docket No. 1 at
alleges that on January 13, 2018, in Velda City, Missouri,
Officer Reppy “stabbed” him six times while
plaintiff was handcuffed. Officer Reppy then “jumped on
top of” plaintiff, choking and tasering him. He states
that Officer Reppy's use of force occurred “for no
reason.” Plaintiff further states that Officer Reppy
failed to tell the paramedic on scene that Reppy had choked
and tasered him.
result of this incident, plaintiff claims that he suffered
abrasions, lacerations, and pain, and that he was treated for
his injuries at Barnes-Jewish Hospital. Plaintiff seeks $1,
000, 000 in damages.
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that defendant Reppy violated his constitutional
rights by using excessive force against him during an arrest.
Officer Reppy is sued in his official capacity only. The
Velda City Police Department is also named as a defendant.
For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff's complaint is
defective and subject to dismissal. ...