United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
acting pro se, filed a complaint for employment
discrimination against his former employer, defendant
Schneider National Carriers, Inc. Plaintiff's claims of
race, color, and gender discrimination, as well as his claims
of harassment/hostile work environment, were dismissed
sua sponte by this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Plaintiff's claim for religious discrimination
remains. Defendant has moved to dismiss the remaining claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (#15.) The
matter is fully briefed. The Court will deny the motion for
the reasons explained below.
filed his complaint on a form provided by the Court for
employment discrimination claims. He checked that he brings
this lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. He also
checked that his claim involves termination of his
employment, that the terms and conditions of his employment
differ from those of similar employees, retaliation, and
harassment. He checked that he believes he was discriminated
against on the basis of his race, religion, color, and
gender. As indicated above, only his religion-based claims
remain in this case.
narrative section of the complaint, plaintiff states that his
supervisor, Jack Falina, was not physically present on the
job site, but that he was ordered to report only to Falina.
Plaintiff had been recently hired by defendant and was being
trained to operate a Moffitt Machine, which is similar to a
forklift. Plaintiff said he was not allowed to work at all
unless he received approval from Falina. He states he tried
to contact Falina by phone for a week before Falina, who had
been on leave to attend a funeral, answered his phone.
Plaintiff complained to Falina that Falina had not left
someone else in charge to finish plaintiff's training.
Plaintiff states that Falina
became upset and stated that I wasn't committed to the
job… I explained to Jack that my whole purpose for
calling him, and the very fact that I work for Schneider was
because I wanted to work. Jack stated that he didn't
think I was willing to “bust my ass” for his
account, and that he had “no more work” for me!!!
Stating that it shouldn't have taken so long for training
to be completed. I asked Jack if [illegible] could
speak to me with respect, as I speak to him with respect via
Christ's command of love your neighbor as yourself. Again
Jack stated that he was “done with me” and that
he had “no more work for me”!!! I asked for
written decision of Jack's position but Jack declined and
hung up the phone. I then spoke with H. Connelly as well as
Human Resources, trying to resolve this matter. I was told by
both parties that Jack is my (DBL) Driver Business Leader,
and he makes the final decision on the matter. At that point,
I contacted the Missouri Division of
attached to his complaint his Charge of Discrimination that
he filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights. He
states in that document that on November 21, 2018, he was
informed by Falina that
I needed to “bust my ass” when on the clock. I
informed Jack that I was offended by the language being used
because of my religion, and I would feel more comfortable if
he didn't address me in that manner. Jack stated,
“I'm done with you I have no more work for
you”, in response terminating my employment….
…I believe that I was discharged due to my
religion-Footstep Follower of Christ.
filed the instant motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint
so as to eliminate those actions “which are fatally
flawed in their legal premises and deigned to fail, thereby
sparing litigants the burden of unnecessary pretrial and
trial activity.” Young v. City of St. Charles,
244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989)). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a claim must be facially
plausible, meaning that the ‘factual content. . .
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'”
Cole v. Homier Dist. Co., Inc., 599 F.3d 856, 861
(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)). The Court must “accept the
allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”
Id. (quoting Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d
1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005)). However, “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, ” will not pass muster.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
contends plaintiff does not set forth a facially plausible
claim under Title VII for religious discrimination. A
disparate treatment case based on religion requires a
plaintiff to show that he was treated less favorably than
others because of his religious beliefs. Mann v.
Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir.1993) (citing
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). To establish a prima
facie case, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a
member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting his
employer's legitimate job expectations; (3) he suffered
an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly-situated
employees outside the protected class were treated
differently. Shanklin v. ...