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Engle v. Land O'Lakes, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

September 3, 2019

Sharon Engle Plaintiff- Appellee
Land O'Lakes, Inc.; Unum Life Insurance Company of America Defendants - Appellants

          Submitted: April 16, 2019

          Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin

          Before SMITH, Chief Judge, ARNOLD and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

          Arnold, Circuit Judge.

         This is an action under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., for a declaratory judgment that the administrator of group insurance plans paid benefits to the wrong person. Administrators of ERISA plans are frequently given the discretion to interpret those plans and to make benefits determinations. This case involves just how much deference courts must afford a plan administrator who exercises that discretion.

         Terry Engle was an employee of Land O'Lakes, Inc., when he tragically died in a car crash. As an employee of Land O'Lakes, Engle had both life insurance and insurance for accidental death provided by Unum Life Insurance Company of America. Under the terms of those plans, Land O'Lakes was designated the fiduciary and plan administrator, but it delegated to Unum the discretion to interpret the plans and to make benefit determinations. Unum's authority included "determining eligibility for benefits and the amount of any benefits, resolving factual disputes, and interpreting and enforcing the provisions of the Plan."

         The plans specify that, when, as here, there is no designated beneficiary, payments will be made, in Unum's discretion, either to the decedent's estate or to surviving family members in a designated order, starting with a spouse, then to children, and then to parents. After Engle died, Unum wrote a letter to his mother, Sharon Engle (whom we will call "Sharon" to avoid confusion), and sought her help in identifying a beneficiary. Unum told Sharon that the information she provided would form the basis of its decision regarding whom to pay. With that understanding, Sharon explained that Engle did not have an estate and that none would be opened for him. She also noted that, though Engle was unmarried at the time of his death, he was survived by two minor children and one Jaclyn Jones, a woman whom Sharon identified as Engle's domestic partner.

         Apparently of the view that a domestic partner could count as a spouse under the plans, Unum asked Jones to complete an affidavit verifying that she was Engle's domestic partner. That same day, Sharon spoke with a Unum representative by phone. Notes from the call show that Sharon inquired about the status of the insurance claims, and Unum advised her that it needed Jones to complete an affidavit, which Sharon said she understood. She then asked if "domestic partner" meant something similar to common-law marriage, and the Unum representative opined that it did. The call notes say Sharon then "stated good" because "Terry & Jaclyn lived together & were to be married." Sharon asked how much longer claims processing would take, and when the Unum representative explained it would not take long and that no additional information (besides Jones's affidavit) was needed, Sharon "understood & call ended cordially." Jones soon returned a completed affidavit to Unum, and shortly thereafter Unum paid her $266, 000 under the life and accidental-death plans.

         All appeared well until Sharon contacted Unum about three months later to complain that it had paid Jones rather than Engle's children. She then opened an estate for Engle and became its personal representative. When Sharon sued Land O'Lakes and Unum on behalf of Engle's estate in Missouri state court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Unum should have paid Engle's estate rather than Jones, the defendants removed the case to federal court. That court remanded the case to Unum to develop the record further: Unum did so and upheld its earlier decision to give the benefits to Jones.

         Back in federal court, the parties moved for summary judgment. The district court sided with Sharon and held that Unum had adopted an unreasonable interpretation of the plans to support its decision to pay Jones rather than Engle's estate. We review the district court's decision de novo. See Manning v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 1030, 1038 (8th Cir. 2010).

         The crux of the parties' dispute is whether Unum reasonably interpreted the plans as allowing it to pay a decedent's domestic partner in the absence of a designated beneficiary. As we noted before, the plans provide that Unum may pay benefits to a decedent's estate or "spouse," if he had one. When Unum made the payments it was operating under Sharon's assurance that Engle did not and would not have an estate, so it was reasonable for Unum to determine whether Engle had a "spouse." The parties dispute whether the word "spouse," as used in this portion of the plans, encompasses domestic partners.

         Unum thought so even though the plans' glossary contained no definition for the word "spouse." Unum relied instead on a reference to "spouse" found elsewhere in the plans. Under a heading delimiting what dependents are eligible for life-insurance coverage, the plan specifies that a "spouse" is eligible and that "'[s]pouse' wherever used includes domestic partner." That same "spousal enlargement language," as the district court termed it, makes an encore under the heading delimiting what dependents are eligible for accidental-death coverage.

         Unum interprets the phrase "wherever used" broadly to mean that the term "spouse" includes a domestic partner even in the provisions involving the payment of benefits. The district court read an implied limit into the spousal-enlargement language and held that the phrase "wherever used" meant only wherever the word "spouse" appeared under the headings relating to insurance coverage, and not to benefits. After all, the district court reasoned, if Unum wanted "spouse" to include domestic partners throughout the plans, then it could have said so in the glossary. The district court rightly pointed out, moreover, that if the phrase "wherever used" is taken literally, then there was no need for Unum to use the enlargement language twice.

         The district court certainly adopted a reasonable reading of the plans, though its interpretation is not without its own difficulties. For example, its interpretation essentially requires reading the phrase "wherever used" to mean "wherever used under this heading," arguably adding words to the plans. Further, if the spousal-enlargement language applies only to uses of the word "spouse" under the heading in which it appears, then curious anomalies arise in other parts of the plans where "spouse" is used. For example, the term "spouse" is used several times in the plans' insurance-portability sections without any enlargement, and it would seem odd to ...

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