United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Central Division
RIA SCHUMACHER, Individually And On Behalf Of All Others, Plaintiffs,
SC DATA CENTER, INC. d/b/a COLONY BRANDS, INC., Defendant.
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY, United States District Judge.
Ria Schumacher moves pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 59 and 60 for reconsideration of the portions of
the Court's order dismissing two of her three claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons
discussed below, the motion is granted.
59(e) motions serve the limited function of correcting
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer
Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Similarly, Rule 60(b) permits
the Court, on motion, to relieve a party from a final
judgment or order for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect, although the “extraordinary
relief” for which Rule 60(b) provides “may be
granted only upon an adequate showing of exceptional
circumstances.” Williams v. York, 891 F.3d
701, 706 (8th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). In short, “[w]here the district court
believes that an earlier decision was reached in error, it
may revisit the decision ‘to avoid later
reversal.'” Conrod v. Davis, 120 F.3d 92,
95 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The Court has
“broad discretion in determining whether to grant a
motion to alter or amend judgment . . . .” Glob.
Network Techs., Inc. v. Reg'l Airport Auth. of Louisville
& Jefferson Cty., 122 F.3d 661, 665 (8th Cir. 1997).
where, as here, not all claims are resolved and the district
court does not direct the entry of a final judgment as to one
or more claims or parties, the decision “‘is
subject to revision at any time before the entry of [final]
judgment.” K.C.1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade
Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed
R. Civ. P. 54(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P 54(b)
(“When an action presents more than one claim for
relief . . ., the court may direct entry of a final judgment
as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only
if the court expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision,
however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or
parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a
judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties'
rights and liabilities.”). “The district court
has the inherent power to reconsider and modify an
interlocutory order any time prior to the entry of
judgment.” K.C.1986, 472 F.3d at 1017
argues that the Court erred when it dismissed Count III (the
failure-to-authorize claim) and Count II (the
Count III - Failure-to-Authorize Claim
Schumacher has alleged that S.C. obtained more information
about her than she authorized S.C. to obtain, in violation of
15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii). That section provides,
in relevant part, that, “a person may not procure a
consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured,
for employment purposes with respect to any consumer, unless
. . . the consumer has authorized in writing . . . the
procurement of the report by that person.”
Court previously concluded that the alleged violation of
Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) “is the type of harm that
Congress intended to prevent in enacting the FCRA and is also
akin to a traditional common law claim.” Doc. 102, p.
12. The Court reasoned as follows:
“[T]o determine whether an intangible harm counts as an
injury in fact, [the Court] must consider Congress'
judgment and whether the alleged intangible harm has a close
relationship to a harm that traditionally provided a basis
for suit in the Anglo-American legal system.”
Heglund v. Aitkin County, 871 F.3d 572, 577 (8th
Cir. 2017); see also Spokeo[, Inc. v.
Robins], 136 U.S. [1540,] 1549 [(2016)].
Congress enacted the FCRA to, among other things
“protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 2205
(2007). The Eighth Circuit has likened an FCRA claim to a
common law claim for invasion of privacy. See Auer v.
Trans Union, LLC, 902 F.3d 873, 877 (8th Cir. 2018)
(noting that “invasion of privacy did provide a basis
for suit at common law”) (citing Braitberg v.
Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir.
Doc. 102, p. 11. “‘[T]he unlawful disclosure of
legally protected information'” causes
“‘a clear de facto injury'”
and “concrete” harm. Long v. Se. Pennsylvania
Transportation Auth., 903 F.3d 312, 322 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, the Court
concluded that “[i]f Ms. Schumacher were able to
support her allegations with evidence, she could establish an
intangible injury to her privacy sufficient to confer
standing.” Doc. 102, p. 12.
the Court previously found that “[t]he evidence in the
record . . . indicates that S.C. received from its
third-party provider nothing more than a criminal background
check, and Ms. Schumacher plainly authorized the third
party's performance of a criminal background
search.” Doc. 102, p. 13. Schumacher argues that this
finding was in error ...