United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Dwayne
Robison for leave to commence this civil action without
prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2). Having
reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted
in support, the Court has determined that plaintiff lacks
sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will
assess an initial partial filing fee of $2.21. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Additionally, for the reasons
discussed below, the Court will order plaintiff to file an
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil
action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount
of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in
his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court
must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average
monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the
average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the
prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial
filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments
of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to
the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The
agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these
monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount
in the prisoner's account exceeds $10.00, until the
filing fee is fully paid. Id.
support of the instant motion, plaintiff submitted a
certified inmate account statement. (Docket No. 7 at 2). The
certified inmate account statement shows an average monthly
deposit of $11.07. The Court will therefore assess an initial
partial filing fee of $2.21, which is 20 percent of
plaintiff's average monthly deposit.
Standard on Initial Review
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss
a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,
which is more than a “mere possibility of
misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense.
Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the
facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber,
820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also
Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73
(8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept
factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required
to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a
reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the
Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A
“liberal construction” means that if the essence
of an allegation is discernible, the district court should
construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits
his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787
(8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints
are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim
for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon,
623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8thCir.
2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to
“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an
additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger
complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint
the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that
procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508
U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
is a pro se litigant who is currently incarcerated the
Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center in
Bonne Terre, Missouri. (Docket No. 8). At the time relevant
to this complaint, however, he was located at the Farmington
Correctional Center in Farmington, Missouri. (Docket No. 1 at
2). He brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
naming Lisa Sanderson, Elizabeth Atterberry, and Kay McIntyre
as defendants. (Docket No. 1 at 2-3). Defendants are sued
in their official capacities only.
states that defendant Sanderson is the Chief of Mental
Health, that defendant Atterberry is the Regional Director of
Mental Health, and that defendant McIntyre is a mental health
doctor. He alleges that Sanderson is punishing him for being
transgender by isolating him in a single-man cell. (Docket
No. 1 at 3). He further states that this has been going on
for seven months.
asserts that being in a single-man cell makes it hard for him
to control his mental health. He claims that Sanderson is
using the “excuse” that he is a sexually active
person for keeping him in a single-man cell. Plaintiff states
that she is making up this “false lie” to keep
him from having a cellmate.
alleges that McIntyre has discriminated against him by
telling him that it would be a “good idea” to
keep him in a single-man cell. He states that McIntyre has
“slander[ed] [his] name” and refused to let him
have a chance in double-man cell.
October 27, 2018, plaintiff was placed on suicide watch.
(Docket No. 1 at 4). Defendant Sanderson kept him on watch
for a week and a half, which plaintiff states was
“above and beyond her job title.” She purportedly
told him the reason he could not have a cellmate was because
he had reported being raped at Potosi Correctional Center.
Plaintiff alleges that Sanderson has taken it upon herself to
isolate him in administrative segregation, even though he is
not a threat to other offenders. However, he acknowledges
that other inmates have not wanted to cell with him because
he is homosexual, and they are homophobic. ...