United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
KELVIN C. THOMPSON, Plaintiff,
CREVE COEUR POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff
Kelvin C. Thompson for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in
this civil action. Upon consideration of the motion and the
financial information provided in support, the Court
concludes that plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee. The
motion will therefore be granted. Additionally, the Court
will dismiss the complaint.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss
a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable
basis in either law or fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not
plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common
sense. Id. at 679. The court must assume the
veracity of well-pleaded facts, but need not accept as true
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements."
Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This
means that "if the essence of an allegation is
discernible," the court should "construe the
complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to
be considered within the proper legal framework."
Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.
2004)). However, even pro se complaints must allege facts
which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law.
Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir.
1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts that
are not alleged, Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15, nor are
they required to interpret procedural rules so as to excuse
mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil
v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113(1993).
brings this action against the Creve Coeur Police Department.
He invokes this Court's federal question jurisdiction,
and states he brings his case pursuant to Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 241-242, 245, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (§ 1981), and
34 U.S.C. § 12601. He alleges he visited the Creve Coeur
Police Department to "file a formal complaint about wire
fraud, and felony stealing that occurred at the Creve Coeur
Post Office on N. New Ballas located directly across from the
police station and/or from the Social Security Office at 1215
Fern Ridge Pkwy in Creve Coeur." Plaintiff alleges that
an officer "refused to file an official report or
investigate criminal behavior at social security
administration." Thereafter, plaintiff told a clerk he
needed to talk to the Police Chief or to another officer, but
the clerk said no one was available and to leave his number.
Plaintiff alleges that no one has contacted him, and that his
calls go unanswered. Plaintiff alleges that certain law
enforcement officers with the Creve Coeur Police Department
are conspiring with the Social Security Administration to
conceal fraud, criminal activity, and civil rights
violations. He seeks "$100, 000 in actual damages and
$1, 000, 000 million in punitive damages."
filing the complaint, plaintiff filed a document titled
"Memorandum for Clerk." (ECF No. 5). Therein,
plaintiff writes he noticed that cases he filed regarding law
enforcement were assigned to Magistrate Judges. He writes:
"I find this ironic and almost impossible that randomly
all these civil cases have been assigned to Magistrate
Judges. These powerful entities with unlimited funds
can't be afraid of an old man? Finally, corruption and
criminal activity at any level are criminal acts and makes
the culprits BLATANTLY CRIMINALS. A TRILLION DOLLAR OPERATION
with thousands of agents and unlimited funding are still
remarkably fundamentally and systematically corrupt, racist
and lack the morality and integrity of great men. Have Ye no
dignity or pride?" Id. (emphasis in original).
carefully reviewed and liberally construed the complaint, the
Court concludes that it must be dismissed. Plaintiff states
he brings this action pursuant to various federal statutes.
However, none are availing. There is no indication plaintiff
had an employment relationship with the defendant or any
person mentioned in the complaint; therefore Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act is inapplicable. Plaintiff does not allege
he suffers from a disability, nor does he set forth
non-conclusory allegations that he is a member of a protected
class or that the defendant purposefully and intentionally
discriminated against him because of his race, color or
national origin. Therefore, the ADA, Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and § 1981 are
unavailing. Additionally, plaintiff is alleging that state
actors violated his civil rights. Therefore, his exclusive
federal damages remedy lies in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S.
701, 731-32 (1989) (Section 1983 provides the exclusive
federal damages remedy for the violation of rights guaranteed
by § 1981 when the alleged violation is by a state
actor). There is no private right of action under 34 U.S.C.
§ 12601, as only the Attorney General may bring a civil
action under that statute. Horde v. Elliot, 2018 WL
987683 (D. Minn. Jan. 9, 2018). Similarly, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241-242 and 245 are criminal statutes that
provide no basis for any private cause of action. See
U.S. v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 846 (8th Cir. 1998)
("Courts have repeatedly held that there is no private
right of action under [18 U.S.C] § 241 . . .");
Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989)
(stating that only a United States prosecutor can bring a
complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242); Roberson
v. Pearson, 2012 WL 4128303, *1 (D. Minn. 2012) (18
U.S.C. § 245 is a federal criminal statute that does not
provide for a private right of action).
Court has considered whether the complaint states a viable
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and concludes it does not.
Plaintiff has named the Creve Coeur Police Department as the
sole defendant. However, the Creve Coeur Police Department is
not an entity that can be sued under § 1983. Therefore,
plaintiffs allegations fail as a matter of law. See
Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark, 974 F.2d 81, 82
(1992) (entities such as police departments are "not
juridical entities suable as such. They are simply
departments or subdivisions of the City government");
see also De La Garza v. Kandiyohi County Jail, 18
Fed.Appx. 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (sheriffs departments and
police departments are not usually considered legal entities
subject to suit under § 1983). Additionally, plaintiffs
allegations would not state a claim of municipal liability.
See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Finally, none of the
statements in plaintiffs Memorandum for Clerk state a viable
claim for relief.
foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this case pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion
to proceed in forma ...