United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. BODENHAUSEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter is before the Court of the petition of De'Angelo
Wilson for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction
of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
De'Angelo Wilson is presently incarcerated at the
Jefferson City Correctional Center in Jefferson City,
Missouri, pursuant to the judgment and sentence of the
Circuit Court of Audrain County. On March 20, 2015,
petitioner pleaded guilty to domestic assault in the second
degree § 565.073, Mo.Rev.Stat. Judgment [Doc. # 15 at
11]; Transcript [Doc. # 15 at 14-22].The Circuit Court of Audrain
County found petitioner to be a prior and persistent
offender and, in accordance with the parties'
plea agreement, sentenced him to a term of ten years'
imprisonment. Transcript [Doc. # 15 at 20]; Judgment. The
court suspended execution of the sentence and placed
petitioner on probation for five years. Id. On
October 16, 2015, petitioner pleaded guilty to three new
charges and admitted that he violated the terms of his
probation.Transcript [Doc. #15 at 23-44]. The circuit
court ordered execution of petitioner's ten-year
sentence. Id. at 29-30. Petitioner did not file a
direct appeal but timely filed a motion for post-conviction
relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035, which
was denied on June 28, 2017. Order [Doc. # 15 at 80-83]. On
February 20, 2018, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the
denial of post-conviction relief. Wilson v. State,
No. ED105775 (Mo.Ct.App. February 20, 2018) [Doc. # 12-3]. On
April 16, 2018, petitioner timely filed his § 2254
petition, in which he asserts four claims challenging the
validity of his guilty plea to second-degree domestic
assault. [Doc. #1].
March 20, 2015, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of
second-degree domestic assault, arising from his conduct on
December 7, 2014. During the plea proceedings, the court
asked petitioner if he understood that by pleading guilty he
was admitting all the essential elements of the charge
against him. [Doc. # 15 at 16]. Petitioner answered that he
so understood. The court then reviewed the elements of the
second-degree domestic assault charge against petitioner: (1)
petitioner recklessly caused serious physical injury to the
victim T.P. by biting and kicking her; (2) they were family
or household members; and (3) they were adults who were or
had been in a continuing social relationship of a romantic or
intimate nature. When asked by the court, petitioner admitted
these elements. Id. at 16-17. Petitioner also
acknowledged that he was charged as a prior and persistent
offender based on two prior felony convictions.
court's direction, the prosecutor recited the facts that
would have been proven at trial: On December 7, 2014, police
officers spoke with victim T.P. at the hospital in Mexico,
Missouri. T.P. told the officers that petitioner had been her
boyfriend for approximately six months. On the day of the
assault, she reported, petitioner instigated an argument. She
left the house and went to a neighbor's home. Petitioner
followed her into the neighbor's kitchen. T.P. told the
officers that petitioner “rushed her and she put her
hands up to protect herself and [petitioner] grabbed her
shoulders using both hands [to pull] her towards him.”
Petitioner “bit her nose” and “then pushed
her to the ground.” Once T.P. was on the ground,
petitioner kicked her in the left rib cage, shoulder, and
head. [Doc. # 15 at 18-19]. The officers observed a
laceration on T.P.'s right nostril, what appeared to be a
small puncture mark on her left nostril, abrasions on her
neck, a baseball-sized red mark on her back between her
shoulders, and baseball-sized bruises on both arms.
Id. at 19-20. In response to a question from the
court, petitioner stated that he agreed with these facts.
Based on petitioner's statements under oath, the court
found that there was a factual basis for his guilty plea,
that he understood the nature of the charge, and that his
plea was voluntary and unequivocal. Id. at 20.
counsel presented a single claim during petitioner's
postconviction proceedings: that he was denied due process of
law when the state court accepted his guilty plea because a
factual basis for the offense of second-degree domestic
assault was not established. PCR motion [Doc. # 15 at 71-75].
The same claim was properly presented on appeal from the
denial of postconviction relief. Appellate brief [Doc. #
claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court
proceedings, habeas relief is permissible under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), only if the state
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
court's decision is “contrary to” clearly
established law if “it applies a rule that contradicts
the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's]
cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially
indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] but
reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton,
544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “The state court need not
cite or even be aware of the governing Supreme Court cases,
‘so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the
state-court decision contradicts them.'” Brown
v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 2004)
(citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)).
“In the ‘contrary to' analysis of the state