United States District Court, W.D. Missouri.
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is Defendant Alonso Anderson's motion
for relief from final judgment, Doc. 179, Plaintiff KCI Auto
Auction, Inc.'s motion to enforce, Doc. 193, KCI's
motion for leave to file excess pages, Doc. 197, and
KCI's motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, Doc. 198.
For the following reasons, the motion for relief from final
judgment is denied, the motion to enforce is granted in part,
the motion for leave to file excess pages is granted, and the
motion for sanctions is denied.
dispute began when a purchasing account used to purchase
vehicles at KCI, the “Lucky 7 Account, ” became
delinquent. KCI brought claims against Mr. Anderson, along
with seven other individuals and three entities, for breach
of contract, action on account, promissory estoppel, account
stated, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent conveyance,
unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, conversion, replevin,
civil conspiracy, constructive trust, injunctive relief,
negligence per se and alter ego/piercing the corporate veil.
Doc. 41 (Amended Complaint).
on the merits of KCI's claims against Mr.
Anderson ended after the Court granted KCI's
motion for summary judgment. Doc. 115. The Court found, in
relevant part, that KCI had a valid contract with Anderson as
a result of an oral “floor plan” agreement made
with two other defendants, who were found to be agents acting
on behalf of Mr. Anderson, and an “Auction Guarantee,
” signed and executed by Mr. Anderson, in which Mr.
Anderson personally guaranteed full payments of any debts.
Id. Although Mr. Anderson argued that KCI's
exhibits were forgeries, that the signature shown on
KCI's exhibits was not his, and that he signed different
papers than those filed by KCI, Doc. 111-1, the Court found
that summary judgment was nonetheless warranted because Mr.
Anderson's affidavit was conclusory and he had admitted
the authenticity of these documents by failing to respond to
KCI's requests for admissions, Doc. 106-2, pp. 11-12. Mr.
Anderson then appealed the summary judgment decision, but the
appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Doc. 122.
the Court's decision, KCI served Mr. Anderson with
post-judgment discovery. Doc. 125. When Mr. Anderson had not
responded some two months later, KCI filed a motion to
compel, which was granted in November 2018. Doc. 134. When
Mr. Anderson again failed to respond to KCI's discovery
despite the Court's Order to do so, KCI motioned to hold
Mr. Anderson in civil contempt, Doc. 135, and the matter was
referred to a Magistrate Judge for a hearing, Doc. 141. Mr.
Anderson did not appear for the hearing, nor did he file any
objections to the Report and Recommendations that resulted.
The Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation, found Mr. Anderson in contempt of court, and
among other things, imposed sanctions accruing for each day
of noncompliance with the Court's prior order and
permitted KCI to submit a record of costs and expenses
incurred to be assessed against Mr. Anderson. Doc. 158.
Anderson now contends that the Court's order granting
summary judgment to KCI should be set aside based on newly
submitted evidence, because the prior judgment was
fraudulently procured and because the judgment is otherwise
void. Doc. 179. KCI claims that Mr. Anderson's motion is
frivolous and he should be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11.
Doc. 198. Separately, KCI seeks to enforce the Court's
prior Orders awarding KCI costs associated with conducting
discovery and sanctions pursuant to the Court's civil
contempt finding. Doc. 193.
Mr. Anderson's Motion for Relief from Final
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that a court may
provide relief from a final judgment “on motion and
just terms” for various reasons, including “newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial” and “fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by
an opposing party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2)-(3). Rule
60(b)(4) also provides for relief when “the judgment is
void.” However, relief under Rule 60(b) is reserved for
“extraordinary circumstances, ” and it is
“‘not intended as a substitute for a direct
appeal from an erroneous judgment.'” Spinar v.
South Dakota Bd. Of Regents, 796 F.2d 1060, 1062 (8th
Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
extent that Mr. Anderson argues the judgment against him
should be set aside because it is wrong, relief pursuant to
Rule 60(b) is untimely. “To prevent its use as a
substitute for a timely appeal on the underlying merits, a
Rule 60(b) motion must be made within thirty days of the
judgment if the alleged error could have been corrected by
appeal of that judgment.” Sanders v. Clemco
Ind., 862 F.2d 161, 169 (8th Cir. 1988). Mr.
Anderson's argument that “[t]he court . . .
misapplied the Summary Judgment Standard by weighing the
evidence and failing to construe the evidence in light [sic]
most favorable to non-movant, ” Doc. 179, p. 5, is
precisely the sort that could have been “corrected by
appeal.” See, e.g., Robert Johnson Grain Co. v.
Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 210-11 (8th Cir.
1976) (reversing summary judgment when factual conflicts were
not resolved in favor of non-moving party). Accordingly,
relief on these arguments is denied.
Rule 60(b)(3), a court may provide relief from an order or
judgment if the movant shows “‘with clear and
convincing evidence, that the opposing party engaged in a
fraud or misrepresentation that prevented the movant from
fully and fairly presenting its case.'” United
States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930,
935 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Harley v. Zoesch, 413
F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2005)). Mr. Anderson alleges that
counsel for KCI 1) abused the discovery process by
“present[ing] questions that [counsel] knew were lies,
” 2) persuaded witnesses to commit perjury, 3) deceived
the Court by treating “Lucky 7 Discount Auto Sales,
LLC” and “Lucky 7 Discount Auto Sales” as
the same entity, and 4) knowingly presented forged documents
to the Court. Doc. 179.
these arguments are grounds for relief or sufficient grounds
to warrant a hearing on Mr. Anderson's motion. First, Mr.
Anderson does not submit any evidence or specific pleadings
to support his allegations of wrongdoing on the part of KCI,
let alone evidence that satisfies the “clear and
convincing” standard. Second, Mr. Anderson has not
shown how these allegations prevented him from fully and
fairly presenting his case. To the contrary, Mr. Anderson
made many of these same allegations in response to the motion
for summary judgment: that KCI's exhibits were forgeries,
that an expert would establish such forgery, the Lucky 7 Used
Cars, LLC is an LLC in good standing, and that KCI
“intentionally left out” parts of the contracts
and tampered with evidence. Doc. 111-1, pp. 2-3, 6-7. By
reasserting these arguments now, Mr. Anderson is merely
trying to relitigate his case and take an impermissible
“second bite at the apple.” Metro. St. Louis
Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d at 936. Finally, assuming that a
party can “present questions that [it] knew were
lies, ” Doc. 179, p. 3, Mr. Anderson merely had to
respond to KCI's requests for admissions to correct the
record. But Mr. Anderson chose not to, and he cannot now
“blame deficiencies in presenting [his] case on
[KCI].” Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d
at 936. Accordingly, Mr. Anderson's motion for relief
based on KCI's alleged fraud or misconduct is denied.
Anderson's recently submitted documents do not change
this outcome, nor do they warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(2).
“[A] Rule 60(b)(2) motion based on the discovery of new
evidence must show (1) that the evidence was discovered after
the court's order, (2) that the movant exercised
diligence to obtain the evidence before entry of the order,
(3) that the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching,
(4) that the evidence is material, and (5) that the evidence
would probably have produced a different result.”
Miller v. Baker Implement Co., 439 F.3d 407, 414
(8th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Mr. Anderson does not
specify which submissions support his claim to relief, so the
Court construes Mr. Anderson's motion to be based on the