United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
CHRISTOPHER W. FAIRCLOTH, Plaintiff,
CORIZON, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
G. FLEISSIG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court upon the motion of pro se
plaintiff Christopher W. Faircloth for leave to commence this
action without prepayment of the required filing fee. Having
reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted
in support, the Court will grant the motion, and assess an
initial partial filing fee of $22.53. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, after reviewing the
complaint, the Court will dismiss this action without
Partial Filing Fee
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil
action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full
amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient
funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the
Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial
partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the
average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or
(2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account
for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial
partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income
credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will
forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each
time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10,
until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
support of the instant motion, plaintiff submitted an inmate
account statement showing average monthly deposits of
$112.67. The Court finds that plaintiff has insufficient
funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee and will
therefore assess an initial partial filing fee of $22.53,
which is twenty percent of plaintiff's average monthly
Standard on Initial Review
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss
a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is
frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. To state a claim
for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal
conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a
plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere
possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.
Id. at 679.
reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
1915, the Court accepts the well-pled facts as true,
White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984),
and liberally construes the complaint. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal
construction” means that if the essence of an
allegation is discernible, the district court should construe
the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or
her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.
Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir.
2015). However, even pro se complaints are required
to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a
matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282,
1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to
supply additional facts or to construct a legal theory for
the pro se plaintiff that assumed facts that had not
an inmate at Farmington Correctional Center
(“FCC”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging violations of his civil rights against
seven defendants: (1) Corizon (contracted with Missouri
Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) to provide
medical services to FCC inmates); (2) J. Cofield (Director of
Operations for MDOC); (3) T. Bredeman (Regional Medical
Director for Corizon); (4) Karen Salsman (licensed counselor
for Corizon at FCC); (5) Lisa Sanderson (social worker for
Corizon at FCC); (6) Matt Strum (Division Director for MDOC);
and (7) Unknown McIntyre (mental health Ttch for Corizon at
FCC). Plaintiff brings his claims against all defendants in
both their individual and official capacities.
alleges that defendants are violating his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process by denying him
access, and a copy of, his mental health records. In
September of 2018, defendant McIntyre denied plaintiff's
request to view and copy his mental health records at FCC.
Plaintiff then filed an IRR. Defendant Karen Salsman
responded to the IRR, denying the request and explaining that
mental health records are not released to inmates while they
are in MDOC custody. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. Plaintiff then filed a
grievance. Defendant Lisa Sanderson denied the grievance,
DOC and Corizon policies do allow for offenders to have
access to and view their medical records. However, mental
health records are not allowed to be on your person while you
are in the custody of Department of Corrections …
Having such records in your possession may likely lead to
safety and security issues for you as well as mental health
ECF No. 1-1 at 3. Plaintiff's appeal of his grievance was
denied by defendants J. Cofield and T. Bredeman.
states that he needs his mental health records to use as
evidence in his Missouri state court habeas corpus Rule 91
petition. Plaintiff asserts that the records will prove that
he was on a “mind-altering substance” because he
was taking the “psychotropic medication” of
Prozac at the time of his plea agreement. ECF No. 1 at 10
& 14. Plaintiff wants to use this evidence to appeal the
length of his sentence in a Rule 91 ...