United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
A. ROSS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for
judgment on the pleadings.(Doc. No. 78). The motion is fully
briefed and ready for disposition. For the following reasons,
the motion will be denied.
11, 2018, Ketterman filed this action against
Chase for violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq.
(“FCRA”), in the Circuit Court of St. Louis
County. The case was removed to this Court on June 13, 2018.
(Doc. No. 1). On January 16, 2019, Ketterman filed a first
amended complaint against Chase alleging that Chase furnished
the credit report agencies (“CRAs”) with
inaccurate information relating to a credit card account that
his “ex-wife opened up” without his
“permission or knowledge.” (First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”), Doc. No. 67 at ¶ 15).
January 16, Chase filed a counterclaim against Ketterman
alleging that on October 9, 2014, it opened and issued him a
credit card account governed by a written Cardmember
Agreement. (Doc. No. 66 at ¶¶ 6-9). Chase further
alleges that Ketterman defaulted on his payment obligations
and that as of the filing of the Counterclaim, the
outstanding unpaid balance is $5, 285.60, plus attorneys'
fees and costs. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18). Chase
alleges counterclaims for breach of contract, suit on account
and unjust enrichment.
moves for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Court
lacks supplemental jurisdiction over Chase's
counterclaims because they do not arise from the same case or
controversy as the instant case brought under the FCRA. (Doc.
No. 78 at 4-6). Ketterman also argues that Chase's
counterclaims are time-barred because they were brought more
than three years after the date of the last payment and past
Delaware's statute of limitations. (Id. at
6-8). In support of its motion, Ketterman submits a copy of
Chase's responses to his interrogatories indicating that
the last payment on the account at issue was September 4,
2015 and that the account was closed on November 5, 2015.
(Doc. No. 78-1).
response, Chase argues that its counterclaim is compulsory
because both the FCRA claims and the counterclaims are
centered on the same issue, i.e., whether Ketterman is liable
on the Account, and if so, in what amount. (Doc. No. 87 at
7-9). Chase further argues that Ketterman cannot rely on
material “outside the pleadings” to support his
argument for dismissal under Rule 12(b). (Id. at
10-11). Lastly, Chase argues that under Delaware's
statute of limitations, the accrual period for a continuous
contract, like a credit card contract, does not begin to run
until the “full damages can be ascertained and
recovered.” (Id. at 12-13).
resolving a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings,
a court must “view the facts presented in the pleadings
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Kaestner v.
Diversified Consultants, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2607 CAS,
2018 WL 465786, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 17, 2018).
“Judgment on the pleadings is not properly granted
unless the moving party has clearly established that no
material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” United
States v. Any and All Radio Station Transmission Equip.,
207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000). “The motion for
judgment on the pleadings only has utility when all material
allegations of fact are admitted or not controverted in the
pleadings and only questions of law remain to be decided by
the district court.” Stewart v. City of St.
Louis, No. 4:04CV885 RWS, 2006 WL 389837, at *1 (E.D.
Mo. Feb. 17, 2006) (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1367).
FCRA claim invokes original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) permits the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims “so
related to” the claim invoking original jurisdiction
that the claims “form part of the same case or
controversy.” This includes counterclaims, which may be
compulsory or permissive. A counterclaim is compulsory if it
“arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claims and
does not require adding another party over whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(a)(1).
Supplemental jurisdiction automatically extends to compulsory
counterclaims. St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Lifecare Int'l,
Inc., 250 F.3d 587, 594 (8th Cir. 2001).
claim that is not compulsory” is permissive.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(b). Courts within the Eighth Circuit have
assumed, without deciding, that supplemental jurisdiction
exists over at least some permissive counterclaims that,
although not arising from the same transaction or occurrence
under Rule 13(a), nevertheless form part of the same case or
controversy as required under § 1367(a). Ensz v.
Chase Bank USA NA, No. 18-CV-2065-CJW-MAR, 2019 WL
136982, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 7, 2019) (citing Riazi v.
Ally Fin., Inc., No. 4:17CV1705JCH, 2017 WL 4260847, at
*4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2017); Graf v. Pinnacle Asset
Grp., LLC, NO. 14-1822-SRN/SER, 2015 WL 632180, at *5
(D. Minn. Feb. 12, 2015)). Claims are a part of the same case
or controversy if they “derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact, ” such that the parties “would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding.” ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir. 2011)
instant motion, Ketterman argues this Court lacks
supplemental jurisdiction over Chase's counterclaim
because it does not arise from “the same case or
controversy” as his FCRA claim. Ketterman relies on
cases comparing the elements of TCPA claims and FDCPA claims
to a defendant's counterclaims to collect the underlying
debt and finding the counterclaims were not part of the same
case or controversy because they required largely different
evidence. (Doc. No. 78 at 4-5) (citing Ensz, 2019 WL
136982, at *4; Vecchia v. Ally Financial, Inc., No.
8:17-CV-2977-T-23AAS, 2018 WL 907045, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb.