United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
the Court is Defendant U.S. Insurance Claim Solutions, Inc.
(“Defendant”)'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2)
(“the Motion”). (Doc. 9.) The Motion is fully
briefed. (Docs. 9-1, 12, 13.) After careful consideration and
for the reasons below, the Motion is
GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED
Complaint provides the following allegations. ClaimSolution,
Inc. (“Plaintiff”) is a Missouri corporation.
Plaintiff provides insurance claims processing and
administration services in connection with both commercial
and personal lines of business. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff also
offers adjusting and appraisal services for insurance
companies. Plaintiff is the owner of the trademark
registration for “CLAIMSOLUTION” issued by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office on October 30,
2007, Registration No. 3, 324, 297. Plaintiff has registered
the internet domain name “www.claimsolution.com”
and uses this website to market, advertise, and promote its
is incorporated in and maintains its principal place of
business in California. Defendant assists insured individuals
and companies with processing claims in their respective
insurance company. Defendant markets, advertises, and
promotes itself to the public as “US Claim
Solutions.” Defendant has registered the internet
domain name “www.claimsolutions.net” and uses the
website to market, advertise, and promote its services.
“currently and continuously uses the trademark
CLAIMSOLUTION in association with the registered goods and
services in nationwide commerce and claims an actionable and
protectable interest in the trademark.” (Doc. 1, ¶
10.) “US Claim Solutions is confusingly similar to
CS's [Plaintiff] registered trademark
CLAIMSOLUTION.'” (Doc. 1, ¶ 17.) “The
similarity has and will cause market confusion.” (Doc.
1, ¶ 18.) On December 17, 2017, Plaintiff sent a letter
to Defendant notifying Defendant that it was infringing on
Plaintiff's registered trademark and demanded that
Defendant cease any further use of the registered trademark.
Defendant continues to use “US Claim Solutions”
in connection with its business and has continued to market
and promote its services through its website. Plaintiff
alleges the goodwill and reputation of Plaintiff's
business in connection with the CLAIMSOLUTION trademark is of
significant value, and Plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury should Defendant's infringement continue.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following causes of
action: trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(A); common law trademark infringement
and unfair competition; and cybersquatting pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 1125(D).
asserts this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant
because: (1) “Defendant has engaged in acts or
omissions within the State causing injury, has engaged in
acts or omissions outside this State resulting in injury
within this State, ” and (2) Defendant “has
otherwise made or established contacts with this State
sufficient to permit the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.” (Doc. 1.)
issue in the Motion is whether this Court has personal
jurisdiction over Defendant. To survive a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must allege
“sufficient facts in the complaint to support a
reasonable inference that the defendant can be subjected to
jurisdiction in the forum state.” Steinbuch v.
Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 585 (8th Cir. 2008). “[T]he
party asserting [personal] jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case.” Id. A
complaint will be factually deficient if it does not allege
sufficient facts upon which jurisdiction can rest. Dever
v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir.
2004). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the court must view the allegations in the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Clockwork IP, LLC v. Clearview Plumbing & Heating
Ltd., 127 F.Supp.3d 1020, 1025 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 31, 2015).
are two types of personal jurisdiction, specific and general
jurisdiction. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
137 (2014). General jurisdiction refers to a
court's authority over a defendant where the case before
the court is unrelated to the defendant's forum
activities. Id. at 127. To be subject to general
jurisdiction, a corporation's affiliations with the forum
state must be “so constant and pervasive ‘as to
render [it] essential[ly] at home'” in that state.
Id. “[W]hen ‘a corporation is neither
incorporated nor maintains its principal place of business in
a state, mere contacts, no matter how ‘systematic and
continues,' are extraordinarily unlikely to add up to an
‘exceptional case.'” State ex rel.
Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d
41, 48 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting Brown v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 629 (2nd Cir.2016)).
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant exists if the
defendant “has purposefully directed [its] activities
at [forum state] residents in a suit that arises out of or
relates to these activities.” Johnson v.
Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). “A federal court may
assume jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only to the
extent permitted by the forum state's long-arm statute
and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.”
Clockwork IP, LLC, 127 F.Supp.3d at 1025 (citing
Dakota Industries, Inc. v. Ever Best Ltd., 28 F.3d
910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994)). Missouri's long-arm statute
Any person or firm, whether or not a citizen or resident of
this state, or any corporation, who in person or through an
agent does any of the acts enumerated in this section,
thereby submits such person, firm, or corporation, and, if an
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising
from the doing of such acts: (1) The transaction of any
business within this state; (2) The making of any contract
within this state; (3) The commission of a tortious act
within the state; (4) The ownership, use or possession of any
real estate in this state . . . Only causes of ...