United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CATHERINE D. PERRY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff
Calvin Hutson for leave to commence this civil action without
prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2). Having
reviewed the motion, the Court has determined that plaintiff
lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will
assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.83. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Additionally, for the reasons
discussed below, the Court will dismiss plaintiff's
official capacity claim without prejudice, but will direct
the Clerk of Court to issue process on defendant William D.
McKinney, Jr. in his individual capacity.
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil
action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount
of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in
his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must
assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average
monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the
average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the
prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial
filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments
of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to
the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The
agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these
monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount
in the prisoner's account exceeds $10.00, until the
filing fee is fully paid. Id.
support of the instant motion, plaintiff has submitted a
certified inmate account statement. (Docket No. 3). The
account statement shows an average monthly deposit of $9.15.
The Court will therefore assess an initial partial filing fee
of $1.83, which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average
Standard on Initial Review
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss
a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief,
which is more than a “mere possibility of
misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense.
Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the
facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber,
820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also
Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73
(8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept
factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required
to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a
reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the
Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A
“liberal construction” means that if the essence
of an allegation is discernible, the district court should
construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits
his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787
(8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints
are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim
for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon,
623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th
Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to
“assume facts that are not alleged, just because an
additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger
complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint
the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that
procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508
U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
is currently incarcerated at Potosi Correctional Center (PCC)
in Mineral Point, Missouri. (Docket No. 1 at 3). He brings
this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming Dr.
William D. McKinney, Jr. as defendant. Dr. McKinney is
employed by Corizon and provides health care at PCC. He is
sued in both his official capacity and individual capacity.
states that he arrived at PCC on May 1, 2013. (Docket No. 1
at 5). At that time, he had been diagnosed with left arm
thrombosis. Initially, he was prescribed medication for this
condition by a specialist. However, after two years, this
medication ran out. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. McKinney
refused to renew the medication. He also claims that Dr.
McKinney has refused any further treatment. Due to a lack of
treatment, plaintiff states that his hand is now deformed and
tightened into a fist. Plaintiff asserts that he has sent
several medical service requests asking for surgery to fix
his hand, but all requests have been denied. He alleges that
despite losing the use of his hand and suffering pain, Dr.
McKinney continues to deny him medical care.
seeks money damages, an injunction, and declaratory judgment.
(Docket No. 1 at 6). Specifically, he is requesting $1
million in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He
alleges that Dr. McKinney has been deliberately indifferent
to his medical needs regarding his left arm thrombosis.
Having thoroughly reviewed and liberally construed
plaintiff's complaint, and for the reasons discussed
below, plaintiff's official capacity claim against Dr.
McKinney must be dismissed. ...