United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CHARLES A. SHAW, JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment
filed by defendant Megan Brennan, Postmaster General, United
States Postal Service. Pro se plaintiff Leroy Gage has not
filed an opposition and the time to do so has passed.
Plaintiff did file a “statement of responses to
uncontroverted material facts” with unlabeled exhibits.
(Doc. 42) For the following reasons, the motion will be
December 13, 2017, plaintiff, a former employee of the United
States Postal Service (“USPS”), filed this pro se
lawsuit against defendant Megan Brennan, Postmaster General
of the United States Postal Service, using the Court's
pre-printed Employment Discrimination Complaint Form. (Doc.
1). Plaintiff alleges he was discriminated against from
“2008 to the present” and checked the boxes
indicating he brought the action pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e, et seq.; the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621, et seq.; the American with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§
12101, et seq.; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq.
(“Rehabilitation Act”). Plaintiff also checked
the box for “Other” and wrote “retaliation
attached six-page Supplemental Complaint, plaintiff alleges
he experiences complications from “multiple conditions
including diabetes; hypertension; arthritis; and back, knee,
and hip injuries[, ]” but performed his duties and
responsibilities for the USPS in a competent and satisfactory
manner. (Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 7, 14). Plaintiff states he
was involuntarily reassigned from City Carrier Technician to
“several unassigned Full-Time Carrier Technician, under
the same occupation code, position type, and with
corresponding pay.” Id. at ¶ 14.
Plaintiff further alleges he reported to work on time every
day and, after one hour of work, defendant would direct him
to “end his tour of duty.” Id. at ¶
15. Plaintiff alleges he was not provided with reasonable
accommodations for his medical conditions although he
“did not request a reasonable accommodation.”
Id. at ¶ 19.
February 16, 2018, defendant filed a partial motion to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a
claim. (Doc. 3). On June 25, 2018, the Court granted
defendant's motion and dismissed plaintiff's Title
VII, ADA, and ADEA claims. (Docs. 14 and 15). Thus, the only
remaining claims in this action are under the Rehabilitation
Act, including retaliation.
now moves for summary judgment, arguing plaintiff's
claims under the Rehabilitation Act are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because this Court has already
addressed and dismissed plaintiff's discrimination and
retaliation claims in Gage v. Potter, No. 4:09-CV-52
CEJ, 2009 WL 5220159 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2009)
(“Potter I”). In the alternative,
defendant argues that plaintiff's remaining claims fail
on their merits because plaintiff is not a qualified
individual, did not suffer an adverse employment action, and
was not denied a reasonable accommodation.
threshold matter, pro se pleadings are to be liberally
construed and are held to less stringent standards than those
drafted by an attorney. Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l
Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994). This
means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernible ... then the district court should construe the
complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to
be considered within the proper legal framework.”
Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quoted case omitted). The Court will not, however, supply
additional facts or construct a legal theory for a pro se
plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded.
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
standards applicable to summary judgment motions are well
settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a
court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the
information before the court shows “there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
initial burden is placed on the moving party. City of Mt.
Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838
F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988) (the moving party has the
burden of clearly establishing the non-existence of any
genuine issue of fact that is material to a judgment in its
favor). Once this burden is discharged, if the record shows
that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the
non-moving party who must set forth affirmative evidence and
specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute on a
material factual issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the
allegations in his pleadings, but by affidavit and other
evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e);
Herring v. Canada Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026,
1029 (8th Cir. 2000); Allen v. Entergy Corp., 181
F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir. 2000). The non-moving party
“must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A dispute about a
material fact is “genuine” only “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Herring, 207
F.3d at 1029 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A
party resisting summary judgment has the burden to designate
the specific facts that create a triable question of fact.
See Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d
1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 2004). Self-serving, conclusory
statements without support are not sufficient to defeat
summary judgment. See Conolly v. Clark, 457 F.3d
872, 876 (8th Cir. 2006).
this standard in mind, the Court accepts the following facts
as true for purposes of resolving this motion for summary