United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
TIMOTHY P. O'LAUGHLIN, Petitioner,
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
SHIRLEY PADMORE MENSAH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on petitioner Timothy P.
O'Laughlin's petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docket No. 1). For the
reasons discussed below, the petition appears to be
time-barred and moot, as petitioner is no longer in custody
under the conviction he is attacking. As such, the Court will
order petitioner to show cause why his petition should not be
Petitioner is presently being held at the United States
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield,
Missouri, pursuant to a commitment under 18 U.S.C. §
4246. He brings this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a state court conviction.
was charged in Missouri state court with one count of
third-degree assault. State of Missouri v.
O'Laughlin, No. 2104R-05539 (21st Cir.,
St. Louis County). He pled guilty on November 27, 2006, and
was sentenced that same day to one year of incarceration.
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 23,
2019, by placing it in his institution's mailing
system. (Docket No. 1 at 13). He states three
grounds for relief. First, he alleges that St. Louis County
never had legitimate charges against him. (Docket No. 1 at
5). Next, he states that his alleged crimes could not be
proven. (Docket No. 1 at 6). Finally, he claims that he was
unaware that he could have reversed his November 27, 2006
guilty plea within thirty days. (Docket No. 1 at 8).
reasons discussed below, petitioner's petition for writ
of habeas corpus appears to be time-barred, as the statute of
limitations expired on December 7, 2007, and petitioner did
not file the instant action until January 23, 2019.
Furthermore, it does not appear that petitioner was in
custody under the conviction he is attacking at the time he
filed this petition, making his petition moot.
Statute of Limitations
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), Congress established a one-year statute of
limitations period for petitioners seeking federal habeas
relief from state court judgments. Finch v. Miller,
491 F.3d 424, 426 (8th Cir. 2007). This one-year
period begins to run on the latest of four alternative dates.
Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 804
(8thCir. 2001). Relevant here is the provision
stating that a habeas petitioner has one year from the date
his judgment becomes final to file his federal petition for
writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
United States Supreme Court has held that a judgment becomes
final under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking
review in the state's highest court expires. Gonzalez
v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012). For Missouri
prisoners who do not file a direct appeal, judgment becomes
final ten days after sentencing. See Camacho v.
Hobbs, 774 F.3d 931, 935 (8thCir. 2015)
(stating that when a petitioner foregoes state appeals, the
court must look to state-court filing deadlines to determine
the expiration of the time for seeking direct review); and
Mo. S.Ct. R. 81.04(a) (“No such appeal shall be
effective unless the notice of appeal shall be filed not
later than ten days after the judgment, decree, or order
appealed from becomes final”).
was sentenced in state court on November 27, 2006. He did not
file an appeal. Thus, his judgment became final on December
7, 2006, ten days after his sentencing. Under the AEDPA,
petitioner had one year from the date his judgment became
final in which to file his federal petition for writ of
habeas corpus. In other words, he had until December 7, 2007,
to timely file his petition. He did not file the instant
petition until January 23, 2019, approximately eleven years
after his limitations period expired. Moreover, petitioner
did not file any state post-conviction actions that might
have tolled any of this time. As such, it appears that his
petition is time-barred.
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “a district court shall
entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis
added). An incarcerated petitioner's challenge to the
validity of his or her conviction always satisfies the
case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration
itself, or the restrictions imposed by parole, constitute a
concrete injury. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998). Once a petitioner's sentence has expired, though,
there must be some concrete and continuing injury,
“some collateral consequence of the conviction, ”
in order to maintain the suit. Id. In ...