United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
W. SIPPEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Sierra Club moves for partial summary judgment, seeking a
declaration that it has organizational standing in this
matter. There is no dispute of material fact that (1) some of
Sierra Club member's aesthetic and recreational interests
have been lessened by Rush Island's excess emissions, and
(2) that injury in fact is traceable to Ameren's actions
and (3) redressable by the requested relief. The Sierra Club
meets the other requirements for organizational standing. As
a result, the Sierra Club has standing to seek injunctive
relief at the Rush Island coal-fired power plant, and I will
grant the Sierra Club's motion for partial summary
in this Clean Air Act case seek injunctive relief requiring
Ameren to install the best available control technology
(BACT) at Ameren's Rush Island coal-fired power plant.
Plaintiffs also seek emissions reductions from another Ameren
plant, Labadie Energy Center (“Labadie”), to
account for excess emissions from Rush Island. On January 23,
2017, after a bench trial, I found that Ameren violated the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., by
failing to obtain a permit before making major modifications
to its Rush Island Plant. (ECF No. 852).
trial, I granted the Sierra Club's motion to intervene.
[No. 863]. The Sierra Club now moves for partial summary
judgment on the issue of standing. The Sierra Club argues
that it has organizational standing to seek relief based on
the declarations made by four of its members who live or
recreate near or downwind of Rush Island. As summarized by
the Sierra Club, those declarations state that:
• Douglas Melville lives in the St. Louis area and leads
a weekly hiking group on outings throughout the region,
including the parks and trails near the Rush Island plant. He
is concerned about the health effects of Rush Island's
excess emissions on himself and the hikers on his outings,
and he has stopped leading hikes in a river bluff area near
Rush Island called Fults Hill. (SMF, ¶¶ 22-25).
• Gregg Aubuchon lives in Festus approximately 10 miles
from Rush Island, and his concerns about the plant's
excess emissions are heightened by the breathing difficulties
he experiences when working outside in his yard. He does not
experience these breathing issues at his country home 75
miles south of Festus, and so he has been spending
increasingly more time at his country home. (SMF,
• Gary Kappler also lives in Festus approximately 10
miles from the Rush Island plant, and he frequently goes wade
fishing and hunting for archeological artifacts at his family
farm located 13 miles from Rush Island. His enjoyment of
these activities is diminished by his concerns that the
plant's excess emissions increase his risk of health
harms. (SMF, ¶¶ 29-31).
• Dale Wojtkowski lives in central Illinois, 39 miles
northeast of Rush Island, and he spends considerable time
outdoors on his four-acre property. He is concerned about
exposure to Rush Island's excess emissions from the
westerly winds, and the potential health effects on himself,
his wife, and his neighbors. (SMF, ¶¶ 32-34).
(Sierra Club's Memorandum in Support, ECF No. 942 at 4).
argues that there are disputes of material fact concerning
these four members' Article III standing in this matter.
Ameren argues that (1) these individuals have experienced no
injury in fact, (2) any injury they have experienced is not
traceable specifically to excess emissions from Rush Island,
and (3) their own deposition testimony suggests that their
alleged injuries are not redressable by the relief sought.
Finally, Ameren argues that even if the Sierra Club has
established standing with respect to the relief sought at
Rush Island, it has not established standing with respect to
the relief sought at Labadie.
individual to establish Article III standing, she must show
(1) has suffered an “injury in fact” that is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and 3)
it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that ...