Submitted: September 28, 2018
from United States District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa - Davenport
SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
Roman challenges his Sentencing Guidelines classification as
a career offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
Specifically, Roman argues that his conviction for aggravated
battery on a public way in Illinois is not a crime of
violence. See id. § 4B1.2(a). We disagree and
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.
Roman's presentence investigation report (PSR) classified
him as a career offender. At sentencing, Roman opposed the career
offender classification, arguing that his 2012 Illinois
conviction for aggravated battery on a public
is not a crime of violence. The district court disagreed,
accepted the PSR's recommendation, and sentenced Roman as
a career offender. The court ultimately imposed a sentence of
220 months' imprisonment.
appeal, Roman asks this court to reverse the imposition of
the career offender enhancement. He argues that his Illinois
conviction for aggravated battery on a public way is not a
crime of violence. "We review de novo the district
court's determination that a conviction constitutes a
crime of violence." United States v. Williams,
899 F.3d 659, 662 (8th Cir. 2018).
Guidelines state that "[a] defendant is a career
offender" subject to an offense level enhancement
if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the
time the defendant committed the instant offense of
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony
that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
"crime of violence" under the Guidelines' force
clause is "any offense under federal or state law
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year that
'has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of
another.'" United States v. Harris, 907 F.3d
1095, 1095 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a)(1)). Roman avers that his 2012 conviction in
Illinois for aggravated battery on a public way is not a
crime of violence because physical or bodily injury can be
caused "without using violent force" under the
statute. Appellant's Br. at 16.
determine whether Roman's Illinois conviction for
aggravated battery on a public way "has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force," U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1), we apply "the
categorical approach." United Statesv.
Schneider, 905 F.3d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2248
(2016)). The categorical approach "analyze[s] the legal
definition of [Roman's] crime, not his actual acts."
Id.; see also Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569
U.S. 184, 190 (2013) ("Under this approach we look
'not to the facts of the particular prior case,' but
instead to whether 'the state statute defining the crime
of conviction' categorically fits within the
'generic' federal definition of a corresponding
aggravated felony." (quoting Gonzales v.
Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 186 (2007)). "[W]hen
the statute creates a single crime by listing a single set of
elements," "[w]e examine those elements and ask
whether only conduct involving physical force can ...