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Mosley v. Wallace

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division

March 6, 2019

DEVIN MOSLEY, Plaintiff,
v.
IAN WALLACE, et al., Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          RONNIE L. WHITE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30) and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 42). These matters are fully briefed and ready for disposition.[1]

         BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff Devin Mosley ("Mosley") is an offender in the Missouri Department of Corrections ("MDOC") and is currently incarcerated at Southeast Correctional Center ("SECC") in Charleston, Missouri. (Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("DSUMF"), ECF No. 32, ¶1). Defendant George Lombardi was the director of MDOC until he resigned from that position in 2016. (DSUMF, ¶3). Defendant Paula Reed is the Assistant Warden of SEC. (DSUMF, ¶4). Defendant Bill Stange is the Deputy Warden of SECC. (DSUMF, ¶5). Defendant Ian Wallace is the former Warden of SECC. (DSUMF, ¶6). Medical services provider, Corizon Health ("Corizon"), was under contract with MDOC to provide medical services at SECC at all times pertinent to the litigation (DSUMF, ¶7).

         On April 2, 2014, SECC prison custody staff noticed that Mosley had been injured and notified medical staff. (DSUMF, ¶l 1). On April 2, 2014, Mosley was assessed by a nurse who noted Mosley had several burn areas on his face, neck, and chest. (DSUMF, ¶12).[2] The nurse contacted the site practitioner. (Id.). Orders were received to clean the burn areas twice a day, apply silvadene, and cover with non-stick tefla for 10 days. (Id.). Tylenol was also ordered for pain, as needed. (Id.).

         Mosley's scheduled dressing changes on April 3, 2014 did not occur. (DSUMF, ¶13).[3] On April 4, 2014, Family Nurse Practitioner (FNP) Hill admitted Mosley to the Infirmary due to his infection risk. (Id.). On April 17, 2014, Dr. Massey discharged Mosley from the Infirmary. (DSUMF, ¶14). Mosley was reported to "have done very well while in the infirmary so that he was released from the Infirmary on April 17, 2014." (DSUMF, ¶18). Dr. Massey noted that Mosley's burns "were healing well and ordered daily dressing changes for lesions that were still open." (DSUMF, ¶14). The last documented dressing change of Mosley's wounds occurred on April 23, 2014. (DSUMF, ¶15).

         On April 14, and July 14, 2014, Mosley "was evaluated by the optometrist for complaints of blurred vision following the alleged assault; no corneal/conjunctival damage was noted during these encounters." (DSUMF, ¶16).

         DISCUSSION

         I. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

         A. Standard of Review

         The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Citrate, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). The substantive law determines which facts are critical and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment. Id. Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

         A moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis of its motion. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material fact, not the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading. Id.

         In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331. The Court's function is not to weigh the evidence but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. '"Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.'" Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).

         B. ...


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