United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
L. WHITE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 30) and Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 42). These matters are fully
briefed and ready for disposition.
Devin Mosley ("Mosley") is an offender in the
Missouri Department of Corrections ("MDOC") and is
currently incarcerated at Southeast Correctional Center
("SECC") in Charleston, Missouri. (Statement of
Uncontroverted Material Facts in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment ("DSUMF"), ECF No. 32,
¶1). Defendant George Lombardi was the director of MDOC
until he resigned from that position in 2016. (DSUMF,
¶3). Defendant Paula Reed is the Assistant Warden of
SEC. (DSUMF, ¶4). Defendant Bill Stange is the Deputy
Warden of SECC. (DSUMF, ¶5). Defendant Ian Wallace is
the former Warden of SECC. (DSUMF, ¶6). Medical services
provider, Corizon Health ("Corizon"), was under
contract with MDOC to provide medical services at SECC at all
times pertinent to the litigation (DSUMF, ¶7).
April 2, 2014, SECC prison custody staff noticed that Mosley
had been injured and notified medical staff. (DSUMF, ¶l
1). On April 2, 2014, Mosley was assessed by a nurse who
noted Mosley had several burn areas on his face, neck, and
chest. (DSUMF, ¶12). The nurse contacted the site
practitioner. (Id.). Orders were received to clean
the burn areas twice a day, apply silvadene, and cover with
non-stick tefla for 10 days. (Id.). Tylenol was also
ordered for pain, as needed. (Id.).
scheduled dressing changes on April 3, 2014 did not occur.
(DSUMF, ¶13). On April 4, 2014, Family Nurse
Practitioner (FNP) Hill admitted Mosley to the Infirmary due
to his infection risk. (Id.). On April 17, 2014, Dr.
Massey discharged Mosley from the Infirmary. (DSUMF,
¶14). Mosley was reported to "have done very well
while in the infirmary so that he was released from the
Infirmary on April 17, 2014." (DSUMF, ¶18). Dr.
Massey noted that Mosley's burns "were healing well
and ordered daily dressing changes for lesions that were
still open." (DSUMF, ¶14). The last documented
dressing change of Mosley's wounds occurred on April 23,
2014. (DSUMF, ¶15).
April 14, and July 14, 2014, Mosley "was evaluated by
the optometrist for complaints of blurred vision following
the alleged assault; no corneal/conjunctival damage was noted
during these encounters." (DSUMF, ¶16).
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Standard of Review
Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if "the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.
Citrate, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Torgerson v. City
of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). The
substantive law determines which facts are critical and which
are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome will properly preclude summary judgment.
Id. Summary judgment is not proper if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. Id.
moving party always bears the burden of informing the Court
of the basis of its motion. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.
at 323. Once the moving party discharges this burden, the
nonmoving party must set forth specific facts demonstrating
that there is a dispute as to a genuine issue of material
fact, not the "mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477
U.S. at 248. The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere
allegations or denials of his pleading. Id.
passing on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 331. The Court's
function is not to weigh the evidence but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. '"Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing
of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge.'" Torgerson, 643 F.3d
at 1042 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).