United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Central Division
NANETTE K. LAUGHREY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendants move
to dismiss for failure to state a claim Counts IV and V of
plaintiff Cassandra Cox's complaint. Those counts allege
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the
“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act (the
“RA”), respectively. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court denies the motion to dismiss.
was an inmate of the Callaway County Jail between February
26, 2018 and February 28, 2018. Complaint, Doc. 1, ¶
During intake at the jail, she advised authorities of various
mental impairments and stated that she was under a particular
physician's active care. Id. at ¶ 35. Her
father also informed a jail officer that Ms. Cox suffered
from certain mental impairments and needed medications for
her disability. Id. at ¶ 44.
of her medical conditions, Defendants placed Ms. Cox in a
holding cell, monitoring her every fifteen minutes.
Id. at ¶ 39. Defendant's policy, procedure,
custom and practice was for jail officers and deputies to
assess an inmate's medical conditions. Id. at
¶¶81-84. Defendants did not contact Ms. Cox's
physician, provide her with prescribed medication, or provide
her any mental health treatment during her incarceration.
Id. at ¶¶ 3, 38, 42, 46, 50, 53-54.
alleges, inter alia, that Defendants failed either
to adopt or to enforce policies, procedures, practices, or
customs to (1) provide mental health services, treatment or
accommodations to jail inmates with mental disabilities
(id. at ¶¶ 56, 61); (2) provide necessary
treatment to those with a mental disability (id. at
¶¶59(c), 60(c)); (3) avoid causing individuals with
mental disabilities to experience significant delays in
receiving prescription psychiatric medications (id.
at ¶¶59(d), 60(d)); and (4) ensure that trained
medical providers assess and diagnose medical treatment for
individuals with disabilities (id. at
¶¶62, 81-84, 115(a) and (e), 133(a) and (e)).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the dismissal of a
complaint that fails to “state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In determining whether a complaint
alleges sufficient facts to state a claim to relief, the
Court accepts all factual allegations as true. Great
Plains Trust Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 492 F.3d 986,
995 (8th Cir. 2007). However, “the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
question before the Court “is not whether a plaintiff
will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled
to offer evidence to support the claims.'”
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167,
184 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
state a claim under Title II of the ADA,  Ms. Cox must
allege that “[s]he is a qualified individual with a
disability denied participation in, or the benefits of, the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity because
of h[er] disability.” Gorman v. Bartch, 152
F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir.1998). To state a claim under the RA,
Ms. Cox must allege that “(1) [s]he is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) [s]he was denied the
benefits of a program or activity of a public entity which
receives federal funds, and (3) [s]he was discriminated
against based on h[er] disability.” Id., at
911 (citations omitted). Thus, apart from the “federal
funding requirement, ” the ADA is “similar in
substance to the Rehabilitation Act, and cases interpreting
either are applicable and interchangeable.”
Id., at 912 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
motion, there is no dispute that Ms. Cox has adequately
alleged that she is a qualified individual with a disability.
The primary issue before the Court is whether Ms. Cox's
ADA and RA claims are for inadequate medical treatment, which
cannot form the basis of claims under the ADA and RA. In
addition, in their reply, Defendants raise for the first time
the argument that Ms. Cox's allegations are threadbare
preliminary matter, the argument that Ms. Cox's
allegations are conclusory is foreclosed because it was not
raised in the original motion papers (Docs. 73-74). See
Bank of Am., N.A. v. UMB Fin. Servs., Inc., 618 F.3d
906, 911 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to consider argument
“because it was . . . raised for the first time in a
reply brief”); Myers v. KNS Dev. Corp., No.
2:17-CV-04076-NKL, 2017 WL 4202242, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 21,
2017) (“Because this argument was raised for the first
time on reply, the Court will not address it.”).
event, Ms. Cox has alleged facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim that she is a qualified individual with a
disability who was denied participation in the services,
programs, or activities of Calloway County because of her
mental illness. See, e.g., Doc. 1, ¶ 115
(“Through its agents[, ] acts and omissions described
herein, Defendant Callaway violated the Rehabilitation Act by
. . . (d) . . . failing to modify its programs and services
to accommodate the needs of persons with mental impairments
such as Plaintiff . . . .”). Ms. Cox has specifically
alleged that she advised jail authorities of her mental
health impairments and alcohol and drug dependency and that
she repeatedly reported that she did not feel well and
“needed to go to rehab.” Id.,
¶¶ 35, 36, 45, 48. She refused all meals on each of
the three days she spent in the jail and she told officers
that she “want[ed] to die.” Id.,
¶¶ 40, 41, 43, 47. Nonetheless, jail authorities
did not offer her medical attention. Id., ...