United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
L. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Dexter
Artis, a prisoner, for leave to commence this civil action
without prepayment of the required filing fee. Having
reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted
in support, the Court has determined to grant the motion, and
assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Additionally, for the reasons
discussed below, the Court will dismiss the complaint,
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil
action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full
amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient
funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court
must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average
monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the
average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the
prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial
filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments
of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to
the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The
agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these
monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount
in the prisoner's account exceeds $10.00, until the
filing fee is fully paid. Id.
did not submit the required inmate account statement in
support of the instant motion. However, in a statement
attached to the complaint, plaintiff averred that he
requested the statement, but his request was ignored. (Docket
No. 1, attch. 5). The Court will therefore assess an initial
partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v.
Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a
prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy
of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an
amount "that is reasonable, based on whatever
information the court has about the prisoner's
Standard on Initial Review
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss
a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. An action is frivolous if it
"lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact."
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An
action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible
claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common
sense. Id. at 679. The court must assume the
veracity of well-pleaded facts, but need not accept as true
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements."
Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
se complaints must be liberally construed. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). This means that
"if the essence of an allegation is discernible,"
the court should "construe the complaint in a way that
permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the
proper legal framework." Solomon v. Petray, 795
F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, even
pro se complaints must allege facts which, if true,
state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v.
Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). Federal
courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged,
Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15, nor are they required to
interpret procedural rules so as to excuse mistakes by those
who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United
States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His
complaint lists three defendants: the Honorable Joe
Satterfield, Prosecuting Attorney Russell Oliver, and Sheriff
Carl Hefner. Plaintiff sues the defendants in their official
and individual capacities. He alleges as follows.
was imprisoned in Mississippi County, but was able to get his
charges dropped. However, Stoddard County charged him with a
robbery he did not commit. On July 20, 2018, Oliver put out a
warrant for his arrest "with lack of evidence only a
glove that had multiple DNA in it. He was only supposed to
question me about it." (Docket No. 1 at 5). Plaintiff
alleges "they held it over my head like it was and used
it to hold me at Stoddard Co." Id. Judge
Satterfield "signed off on the warrant, he failed to do
his job he allowed this to happen," and he chose to hold
plaintiff with no evidence. Id. Plaintiff writes
"Sheriff Carl Hefner holding me unlawfully in Stoddard
County." Id. Plaintiff wrote to Judge
Satterfield, but he is still being held. Plaintiff alleges
"they" put him on the news, and he felt humiliated.
Id. Plaintiff alleges he has suffered false
imprisonment, pain and suffering, and mental stress. He seeks
monetary relief in the amount of $250, 000.
seeks damages against Judge Satterfield for wrongs he
allegedly committed in the course of his judicial duties.
These claims will be dismissed. Judges are absolutely immune
from civil lawsuits based on alleged judicial misconduct.
Imbler v. Pachtman,424 U.S. 409, 434-35 (1976)
(citing Pierson v. Ray,386 U.S. 547 (1967)). This
judicial immunity is subject to two exceptions: (1) when a
judge does not act within his judicial capacity, or (2) when
a judge takes judicial action in the absence of jurisdiction.
Mireles v. Waco,502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991).
"[W]hether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one
relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether ...