United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
TADARRA DEWOYNE SCRANTON TRUST and TADARRA DEWOYNE SCRANTON, Plaintiffs,
ROBERT H. DIERKER, JR., et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
A. ROSS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Tadarra
Dewoyne Scranton for leave to commence this civil action
without prepayment of the required filing fee. Having
reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted
in support, the Court has determined to grant the motion, and
assess an initial partial filing fee of $21.66. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). In addition, for the reasons
discussed below, the Court will dismiss the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil
action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount
of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in
his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must
assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average
monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the
average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the
prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial
filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments
of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to
the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The
agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these
monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount
in the prisoner's account exceeds $10.00, until the
filing fee is fully paid. Id.
support of the instant motion, plaintiff submitted an inmate
account statement showing an average monthly balance of
$108.33. The Court will therefore assess an initial partial
filing fee of $21.66, which is twenty percent of plaintiff s
average monthly balance.
April 2, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court
seeking relief against defendants Robert H. Dierker, Jr.,
Mariano Favazza, Jennifer M. Joyce, Robert Craddick, Anne
Presythe, and Corizon Health Services. See Scranton v.
Dierker, et al, No. 4:18-CV-504-CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 2,
2018) (hereafter "Scranton /')•
Plaintiff sought and was granted leave to proceed in forma
Scranton I, plaintiff identified the plaintiffs and
"intervenors" as himself, the Tadarra Dewoyne
Scranton Trust, Jacob Lew (whom plaintiff identified as the
U.S. Secretary of Treasury), Melba Acosta (whom plaintiff
identified as the Puerto Rican Secretary of Treasury),
"the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.," and Donald J.
Trump. Plaintiffs Scranton I complaint was titled
"Complaint Under Maritime Law and Admiralty Act, Truth
in Admiralty Act, and the Commercial Instruments and Maritime
Liens Act." Plaintiff contended his case was an
admiralty case, and this Court had jurisdiction to consider
his claims under admiralty law. He claimed he created the
"Tadarra Dewoyne Scranton Trust" of which he is
part of the "secured collateral and cargo." He
claimed the defendants had no authority over him or his state
criminal proceedings, and that he, as trustee, brought the
action to obtain possession and control over himself as
property, or as a "vessel" or "cargo."
August 1, 2018, the Court dismissed Scranton I as
legally and factually frivolous on initial review under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Scranton I at ECF No. 12
(Aug. 1, 2018).
than two months after this Court's dismissal of
Scranton I, plaintiff filed the identical 3 3-page
complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia (“Scranton II”). On
December 31, 2018, the District Court for the District of
Columbia transferred Scranton II to this Court
because plaintiff had not established venue in the District
of Columbia. See ECF No. 7. This Court opened
Scranton II as a new case, and assigned it case
complaints in Scranton I and Scranton II
are identical. That is, plaintiffs claims here are identical
to those that were dismissed as frivolous in his closed case,
Scranton I. While the dismissal of Scranton
I "does not bar future litigation over the merits
of a paid complaint making the same allegations as the
dismissed complaint," a § 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal
"has res judicata effect 'on frivolousness
determinations for future in forma pauperis
petitions.'" Waller v. Groose, 38 F.3d
1007, 1008 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citing Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992)); see also Cooper v.
Delo, 997 F.2d 376, 377 (8th Cir. 1993) (§ 1915(e)
dismissal has res judicata effect on future IFP petitions).
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit has held that a complaint
that is duplicative or repetitive of another complaint is
frivolous. Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158-59
(8th Cir. 1992).
this Court determines the § 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal
of Scranton I has res judicata effect and
establishes that this second, identical complaint is
frivolous for § 1915(e) purposes. The Court will
therefore dismiss the complaint as frivolous under §
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to proceed in