Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Caldwell v. United States

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

February 19, 2019

TIMOTHY CALDWELL, Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          JEAN C. HAMILTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         This matter is before the Court on Movant Timothy Caldwell's Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, filed May 25, 2018. (ECF No. 29).

         BACKGROUND

         On August 16, 2001, a federal grand jury returned a single count Indictment charging Movant, a previously convicted felon, with unlawfully possessing a firearm that had traveled in interstate commerce, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). (S e e United States v. Timothy Caldwell, No. 4:01CR350 JCH, ECF No. 1). Following a jury trial on June 27, 2002, Movant was found guilty of being a previously convicted felon in possession of a firearm. (Id., ECF Nos. 41, 42). The offense normally carries a maximum prison term of ten years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Here, however, the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) alleged that Movant qualified for a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA. Specifically, the PSR alleged that Movant qualified for an ACCA sentence of a minimum of fifteen years, based on three prior Missouri convictions for violent felonies, specifically, second degree burglaries. At the time, ACCA defined “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that (1) “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”; (2) “is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives”; or (3) “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Those provisions, respectively, had come to be known as ACCA's “elements clause, ” “enumerated clause, ” and “residual clause.” See United States v. Booker, 240 F.Supp.3d 164, 167 (D.D.C. 2017).

         At sentencing, neither the Government nor Movant objected to the Probation Office's conclusion that Movant was subject to a mandatory minimum of 15 years' imprisonment under ACCA. The Court adopted the finding, and sentenced Movant to 240 months' imprisonment, followed by five years' supervised release. (S e e United States v. Timothy Caldwell, No. 4:01CR350 JCH, ECF No. 47). On August 6, 2003, Movant's conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See United States v. Caldwell, 339 F.3d 680 (8th Cir. 2003).

         Movant filed his first § 2255 motion on September 1, 2004. (S e e Caldwell v. United States, No. 4:04CV1183 JCH, ECF No. 1). This Court denied the motion and dismissed M ovant's claims with prejudice. (Id., ECF No. 9). Movant then filed a series of successive motions, that were all denied.

         On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court held in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), that ACCA's residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, and thus increasing a defendant's sentence under the clause violated the Constitution's guarantee of due process of law. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557, 2563.[1] The Court noted, however, that its decision did “not call into question application of the [ACCA] to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act's definition of a violent felony.” Id. at 2563.

         In United States v. Naylor, 887 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc), the Eighth Circuit considered whether, in light of Johnson's invalidating the residual clause, convictions for Missouri second-degree burglary fit within the ACCA's enumerated clause, specifically, the listed violent felony of “burglary”.[2] The Court ultimately concluded that Missouri's second-degree burglary statute encompasses conduct that is broader than generic burglary. Id. at 407. As a result, under Naylor, convictions for Missouri second-degree burglary do not qualify as predicate violent felonies for ACCA purposes. Id.

         On April 6, 2018, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Movant's petition for authorization to file a successive habeas application in this Court. (S e e Caldwell v. United States, No. 4:12CV2249 JCH, ECF No. 27). As stated above, Movant filed the instant § 2255 Motion on May 25, 2018, asserting that his sentence should be reduced following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Johnson, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Naylor.

         DISCUSSION

         28 U.S.C. § 2255 permits a federal prisoner to file a motion to “vacate, set aside or correct” a sentence that “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States”, or “was in excess of the maximum authorized by law.” Id., § 2255(a). As stated above, in the instant motion Movant maintains he is entitled to relief under the terms of § 2255 because he no longer qualifies as an Armed Career Criminal under ACCA, and thus cannot lawfully be subjected to ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum. In other words, Movant asserts that following Johnson's invalidation of ACCA's residual clause, and Naylor's conclusion that second-degree burglary does not qualify as a violent felony under ACCA's elements clause, he no longer has three qualifying crimes of violence.

         The Government originally conceded that Movant appeared eligible for relief. (S e e Caldwell v. United States, No. 4:12CV2249 JCH, ECF No. 31, the parties' Joint Request for an Amended Presentence Report regarding Motion to Vacate Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, P. 1). The Probation Office therefore prepared and issued a Resentencing Report and Resentencing Recommendation on September 28, 2018. (S e e United States v. Timothy Caldwell, No. 4:01CR350 JCH, ECF Nos. 90, 91). Movant indicated his acceptance to the revised PSR on October 22, 2018. (Id., ECF No. 92). For its part, however, the Government noted in its response that during the pendency of this case, the Eighth Circuit decided Walker v. United States, 900 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2018), in which it held as follows:

On appeal, Walker now argues that his sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing without application of the ACCA. He maintains that his original sentence relied on the residual clause and points out that his Missouri burglary convictions are no longer valid ACCA predicates under the enumerated-offenses clause in light of recent decisions. See Mathis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016); United States v. Naylor, 887 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc). We review de novo the denial of a § 2255 motion. Holloway v. United States, 960 F.2d 1348, 1351 (8th Cir. 1992).
In authorizing Walker to bring a second motion, we necessarily determined that he had made a prima facie case that he satisfied the requirements of § 2255. See, e.g., Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (explaining the requirements for authorizing a successive § 2255 motion). As relevant here, § 2255(h) precludes a movant from bringing a successive motion unless it contains “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.