United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
C. HAMILTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Movant Timothy Caldwell's
Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, filed May
25, 2018. (ECF No. 29).
August 16, 2001, a federal grand jury returned a single count
Indictment charging Movant, a previously convicted felon,
with unlawfully possessing a firearm that had traveled in
interstate commerce, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e), the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”). (S e e United States
v. Timothy Caldwell, No. 4:01CR350 JCH, ECF No. 1).
Following a jury trial on June 27, 2002, Movant was found
guilty of being a previously convicted felon in possession of
a firearm. (Id., ECF Nos. 41, 42). The offense
normally carries a maximum prison term of ten years.
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Here, however, the
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) alleged
that Movant qualified for a sentencing enhancement under the
ACCA. Specifically, the PSR alleged that Movant qualified for
an ACCA sentence of a minimum of fifteen years, based on
three prior Missouri convictions for violent felonies,
specifically, second degree burglaries. At the time, ACCA
defined “violent felony” as “any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year” that (1) “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another”; (2) “is burglary, arson,
or extortion, [or] involves use of explosives”; or (3)
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.”
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Those provisions,
respectively, had come to be known as ACCA's
“elements clause, ” “enumerated clause,
” and “residual clause.” See United
States v. Booker, 240 F.Supp.3d 164, 167 (D.D.C. 2017).
sentencing, neither the Government nor Movant objected to the
Probation Office's conclusion that Movant was subject to
a mandatory minimum of 15 years' imprisonment under ACCA.
The Court adopted the finding, and sentenced Movant to 240
months' imprisonment, followed by five years'
supervised release. (S e e United States v. Timothy
Caldwell, No. 4:01CR350 JCH, ECF No. 47). On August 6,
2003, Movant's conviction and sentence were affirmed on
appeal. See United States v. Caldwell, 339 F.3d 680
(8th Cir. 2003).
filed his first § 2255 motion on September 1, 2004.
(S e e Caldwell v. United States, No. 4:04CV1183
JCH, ECF No. 1). This Court denied the motion and dismissed M
ovant's claims with prejudice. (Id., ECF No. 9).
Movant then filed a series of successive motions, that were
26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court held in Johnson
v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), that ACCA's
residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, and thus
increasing a defendant's sentence under the clause
violated the Constitution's guarantee of due process of
law. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557,
2563. The Court noted, however, that its
decision did “not call into question application of the
[ACCA] to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of
the Act's definition of a violent felony.”
Id. at 2563.
United States v. Naylor, 887 F.3d 397
(8th Cir. 2018) (en banc), the Eighth
Circuit considered whether, in light of
Johnson's invalidating the residual clause,
convictions for Missouri second-degree burglary fit within
the ACCA's enumerated clause, specifically, the listed
violent felony of “burglary”. The Court
ultimately concluded that Missouri's second-degree
burglary statute encompasses conduct that is broader than
generic burglary. Id. at 407. As a result, under
Naylor, convictions for Missouri second-degree
burglary do not qualify as predicate violent felonies for
ACCA purposes. Id.
April 6, 2018, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted
Movant's petition for authorization to file a successive
habeas application in this Court. (S e e Caldwell v.
United States, No. 4:12CV2249 JCH, ECF No. 27). As
stated above, Movant filed the instant § 2255 Motion on
May 25, 2018, asserting that his sentence should be reduced
following the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson, and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Naylor.
U.S.C. § 2255 permits a federal prisoner to file a
motion to “vacate, set aside or correct” a
sentence that “was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States”, or
“was in excess of the maximum authorized by law.”
Id., § 2255(a). As stated above, in the instant
motion Movant maintains he is entitled to relief under the
terms of § 2255 because he no longer qualifies as an
Armed Career Criminal under ACCA, and thus cannot lawfully be
subjected to ACCA's 15-year mandatory minimum. In other
words, Movant asserts that following Johnson's
invalidation of ACCA's residual clause, and
Naylor's conclusion that second-degree burglary
does not qualify as a violent felony under ACCA's
elements clause, he no longer has three qualifying crimes of
Government originally conceded that Movant appeared eligible
for relief. (S e e Caldwell v. United
States, No. 4:12CV2249 JCH, ECF No. 31, the parties'
Joint Request for an Amended Presentence Report regarding
Motion to Vacate Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
P. 1). The Probation Office therefore prepared and issued a
Resentencing Report and Resentencing Recommendation on
September 28, 2018. (S e e United States v. Timothy
Caldwell, No. 4:01CR350 JCH, ECF Nos. 90, 91).
Movant indicated his acceptance to the revised PSR on October
22, 2018. (Id., ECF No. 92). For its part, however,
the Government noted in its response that during the pendency
of this case, the Eighth Circuit decided Walker v.
United States, 900 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir.
2018), in which it held as follows:
On appeal, Walker now argues that his sentence should be
vacated and the case remanded for resentencing without
application of the ACCA. He maintains that his original
sentence relied on the residual clause and points out that
his Missouri burglary convictions are no longer valid ACCA
predicates under the enumerated-offenses clause in light of
recent decisions. See Mathis v. United States, __
U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016); United
States v. Naylor, 887 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2018) (en
banc). We review de novo the denial of a § 2255
motion. Holloway v. United States, 960 F.2d 1348,
1351 (8th Cir. 1992).
In authorizing Walker to bring a second motion, we
necessarily determined that he had made a prima
facie case that he satisfied the requirements of §
2255. See, e.g., Woods v. United States,
805 F.3d 1152, 1153 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (explaining
the requirements for authorizing a successive § 2255
motion). As relevant here, § 2255(h) precludes a movant
from bringing a successive motion unless it contains “a
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously