United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
KAYS, CHIEF JUDGE
case arises out of pro se Plaintiff Shelia Armour's
injuries from using a security wand she alleges was
manufactured by Defendant BCS (“BCS”). Now before
the Court is BCS's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 29)
and Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment (Docs. 33
& 38). As explained below, BCS's motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's motions for
summary judgment are DENIED.
January 2017, Plaintiff worked as a security guard in Kansas
City, Missouri. Her duties involved handling a security wand
she alleges was manufactured by BCS. A security wand is a
small, plastic stick used by security guards to conduct
checkpoints. BCS describes the wand as consisting of a
computer chip and a 3-volt battery. Plaintiff alleges that
one day while working, she touched the exterior tip of a
security wand and received an electric shock.
alleges she suffered burns immediately after she was shocked
by the device. Additionally, she alleges she now suffers from
permanent medical conditions stemming from the electric
shock. To substantiate her injuries, Plaintiff provided
images of her purporting to indicate the burns she suffered
from the electric shock. Also, she includes images of medical
reports but they do not provide her name, nor are they
otherwise traceable to her or this incident.
offers an affidavit from the engineer and product designer of
the security checkpoint wand at issue in this case. This
witness states that the exterior tip of the wand is incapable
of producing electric shock, and incapable of injuring a
person by electric shock (Doc. 30-4 at 1). Further, the
witness states the product is safe for its intended use, is
not defective, and neither unreasonably dangerous, nor
dangerous at all. Id. at 3.
sued BCS seeking $5, 000, 000.00 for her injuries on a theory
that the BCS security wand was defective.
Plaintiff is pro se, the Court is bound to liberally construe
her filings in order to do substantial justice. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). However, a
litigant's pro se status does not excuse her from
compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Local
Rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court is bound to
resolve any doubt as to the existence of any material fact
against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The Court must
scrutinize the evidence presented in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party and accord to it the benefit of every
reasonable factual inference. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-89 (1986). A
moving party is entitled to summary judgment on a claim only
if there is a showing that “there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). A party opposing a
motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the . . . pleadings, but . . . must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
BCS's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
moves for summary judgment arguing Plaintiff has not
submitted any evidence that BCS is liable for her injuries.
After reviewing the record and all supporting exhibits, the
Court finds there are no disputes of material fact and
Plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law.
complaint asserts the BCS security wand is defective. She
states “I have reason to believe BCS is not properly
guarding the electricity inside the device.” (Doc. 7 at
3). In a later filing she asserts “the device is not
properly manufactured.” (Doc. 34 at 1). The Court
construes these two statements, along with ...