United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
A. ROSS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter came before the Court for a hearing on Plaintiff
Stephen Jones' motion for temporary restraining order
(Doc. No. 2), held on July 16, 2018. Plaintiff appeared by
counsel. Counsel for Defendants entered a limited appearance
for the sole purpose of protecting Defendants' rights at
the hearing. The Court heard oral argument and took the
matter under submission. For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff's motion will be granted.
15, 2018, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking a collective
action under Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §216(b). (Doc. No. 1).
Motions for temporary restraining order and class
certification were also filed. (Doc. Nos. 2 & 3).
asserts that this is at least the fourth suit filed against
Defendant Synergies3 Tec Services, LLC
(“Synergies3”) seeking a collective action under
the FLSA. Plaintiff asserts that it is also the third suit
filed against Synergies3 seeking a class action under the
Missouri Minimum Wage Law and Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. All of these
claims similarly allege that Synergies3 fails to pay overtime
wages to its satellite television installation technicians.
motion for temporary restraining order, Plaintiff contends
that Synergies3 has exhibited a pattern of conduct in which
it, upon learning that an FLSA lawsuit had been filed against
it, circumvented counsel to obtain “settlement”
with the named plaintiffs in exchange for the dismissal of
the suit. Plaintiff submits various affidavits in support of
his motion, including the affidavit of one of the
plaintiffs' attorneys in the first case filed against
Synergies3 and a plaintiff in one of the Missouri state
cases. (Doc. Nos. 2-4, 2-5). Plaintiff now seeks an order
from the Court prohibiting Defendants from any settlement
attempts outside the participation of Plaintiff's
hearing, counsel for Plaintiff reiterated the arguments set
forth in his motion for temporary restraining order. Counsel
for Defendants first disputed the Court's jurisdiction to
enter a temporary restraining order against Defendants.
Defense counsel also argued that Plaintiff failed to present
sufficient evidence of actual or threatened misconduct by
for Defendants first argued that the Court did not have
personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they had not
yet been served or answered the Complaint. A federal court
may assume personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
to the extent permitted by the forum state's long-arm
statute and the Federal Constitution. See Dever v.
Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1073
(8th Cir. 2004). Missouri's long-arm statute provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
1. Any person or firm, whether or not a citizen or resident
of this state, or any corporation, who in person or through
an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this section,
thereby submits such person, firm, or corporation, and if an
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising
from the doing of any such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this state; . . .
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 506.500.
construing the statute, Missouri courts have uniformly held
that it is intended to extend jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants to the limits allowed under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Metal Service Center of Georgia, Inc. v. Gaertner, 677
S.W.2d 325, 327 (Mo. 1984); State ex rel. Deere & Co.
v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. 1970). The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a
defendant have such “minimum contacts” with the
forum that exercise of jurisdiction over it does not offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). The defendant's contacts with
the forum must be sufficiently purposeful that it
“should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.” World-Wide ...