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Jackson v. Lombardi

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

May 29, 2018

RICKY D. JACKSON, Petitioner,
GEORGE LOMBARDI, et al., Respondent.



         This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Ricky D. Jackson's Pro Se Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody [1].

         I. BACKGROUND

         Petitioner Ricky D. Jackson (“Petitioner”) was charged and convicted of two counts of forgery in violation of Missouri Revised Statute § 570.090. Petitioner was sentenced to five years imprisonment on each count, to run consecutively. His conviction was affirmed by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District. Petitioner filed a timely motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15. His motion was denied and the judgment was affirmed on appeal.

         The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District described the facts of Petitioner's conviction as follows:

In 2004, the Peoples Bank of Altenburg foreclosed on a commercial building owned by Appellant and used as an auto repair shop. The building was located in Scott County. After the foreclosure, [Petitioner] began sending the bank “some kind of legal documents” that the bank's President and CEO Matthew Puchbauer had not seen before. Mr. Puchbauer did not consent to any lien on any of his property in favor of [Petitioner], and has never borrowed any money from [Petitioner]. Mr. Puchbauer did not respond to [Petitioner's] documents, and did not agree to the documents.
The second and third pages of [State's Exhibit 1] purport to be a Uniform Commercial Code Acknowledgment of Initial Financing Statement (“UCC Acknowledgment”). The UCC Acknowledgment showed [Petitioner] as the Secured Party and [Petitioner], Peoples Bank of Altenburg, Doug Johnson, Matt Puchbauer, Equifax, Experian, and Transunion as Debtors. The UCC Acknowledgment was not signed by any person identified as a Debtor or [Petitioner]. In an area labeled “Collateral, ” the UCC Acknowledgment stated:
The Debtors have consented to this Admiralty Maritime lien filing in the International Commercial Claim Within the Admiralty Administrative Remedy Judgment by Estoppel Agreement/Contract File #RDJ01022005, Registered # PR 799 080 690 US, perfected on May 2, 2005 in the accounting and True Bill amount of $52, 496, 006.16. All personal and real property; bank accounts, foreign and domestic; private exemptions; government risk management accounts; insurance policies; stocks and bonds; asset accounts; investments and future earnings of the Debtors is now the property of the Secured Party.
The UCC Acknowledgment showed a “File Date/Time” of “10/11/2005 12:49AM.”
The first page of [State's Exhibit 2] contains the phrases “Petition for Agreement and Harmony within the admiralty in the Nature of a NOTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CLAIM IN ADMIRALTY ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY, ” “FILE #RDJ01022005, ” and “Dated: January 2, 2005.” [Petitioner] appears to have signed the exhibit on pages 6 and 11. In an area labeled “ACCOUNTING AND TRUE BILL” on page 10 of the exhibit, the following items are listed: “Compensatory Damages” in the amount of $261, 174.16 ($65, 293.54 “Sum Certain of Actual Cost Funds” multiplied by a “Rights Violations Compensation Multiplier” of 4), “Punitive Damages” in the amount of $52, 234, 832.00 ($261, 174.16 “Sum Certain of Actual Cost Funds” multiplied by a “Punitive Compensation Multiplier” of 200), and “Total Damages for Conversion” in the amount of $52, 496, 006.16.
[Petitioner's] sister-in-law, Sheila Camden, and [Petitioner's] son attempted to file the UCC Acknowledgment with the Scott County Recorder of Deeds on October 11, 2005. The Recorder refused to file the document. Ms. Camden testified that she handed the UCC Acknowledgment to [Petitioner's] son when they arrived outside of the Recorder's office, Ms. Camden and [Petitioner's] son then went upstairs, and [Petitioner's] son handed the UCC Acknowledgment to the clerk. After the Recorder refused to file the UCC Acknowledgment, [Petitioner] “typed” a written statement for Ms. Camden's signature . . . At [Petitioner's] request, Ms. Camden signed that page and then mailed [it] to the Recorder of Deeds. Ms. Camden did not have “any actual personal knowledge” about the UCC Acknowledgment. Ms. Camden frequently notarized documents for [Petitioner] ¶ 2004 and 2005 that [Petitioner] printed from his computer. Ms. Camden also mailed documents for [Petitioner]. Ms. Camden notarized several documents for [Petitioner] . . . that were related to the UCC Acknowledgment.
The Recorder of Deeds testified that Ms. Camden told the Recorder, “[Petitioner] wanted the [UCC Acknowledgment] on record.” [Petitioner] called the Recorder, and told the Recorder “just record the damn thing.” The Recorder again refused to record the UCC Acknowledgment. The Recorder “was guessing that it was a . . . fraudulent document. I mean, it's talking about $52 million, and I haven't got many $52 million financing statements.” The form also “looked a little suspicious” to the Recorder, and did not appear to be authorized by statute.

ECF No. 12-5, pgs. 2-6.[1] At trial, Petitioner represented himself after his last retained attorney was granted permission to withdraw. An attorney was not appointed, because Petitioner was not indigent. Petitioner was convicted by a jury and sentenced to two consecutive five-year terms of imprisonment. Petitioner now challenges his convictions.

         II. STANDARD

         “A state prisoner who believes that he is incarcerated in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Osborne v. Purkett, 411 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2005). In order for a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a person in custody by order of a state court, the petitioner must show that the state court decision:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct unless the petitioner successfully rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

         A state court's decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent “if the state court either ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases' or ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent.'” Penry v. Garth, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000)). An unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent is found where the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the case. Ryan v. Clark, 387 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004). Finally, a state ...

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