United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
DOUGLAS E. DAYTON, Plaintiff,
RICHARD LISENBE, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff
Douglas E. Dayton, formerly an inmate at Tipton Correctional
Center, for leave to commence this action without payment of
the required filing fee. For the reasons stated below, the
Court finds that plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to
pay the entire filing fee and will assess an initial partial
filing fee of $1.70. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1). Furthermore, based upon a review of the
complaint, the Court finds that the complaint should be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil
action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount
of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in
his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court
must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average
monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the
average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the
prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial
filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments
of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to
the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The
agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these
monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount
in the prisoner's account exceeds $10, until the filing
fee is fully paid. Id.
has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison
account statement for the six-month period immediately
preceding the submission of his complaint. A review of
plaintiff's account indicates an average monthly deposit
of $8.50. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire
filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial
partial filing fee of $1.70, which is 20 percent of
plaintiff's average monthly deposit.
Standard on Initial Review
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court is required to dismiss a
complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead
more than “legal conclusions” and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action [that are] supported by mere conclusory
statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim
for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of
misconduct.” Id. at 679. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. Id. at 679.
reviewing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the
Court accepts the well-pled facts as true. Furthermore, the
Court liberally construes the allegations.
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named
as defendants are Richard Lisenbee, Sheriff of Phelps County,
and Lieutenant Matt Shults. Plaintiff states that he sues
both defendants in their official and individual capacities.
alleges he was brought to the Phelps County Jail on December
5, 2014 and booked on a 24-hour hold pending charges. On
December 6, 2014, he was charged with unlawful use of a
weapon and “had a warrant read to him.” He states
he was not arraigned on the charges until January 28, 2015.
Plaintiff states his detainment in the Phelps County Jail for
54 days prior to being arraigned violates the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
relief, plaintiff seeks $15, 000 in actual damages and $1.5
million in punitive damages.
Supreme Court has held that “to recover damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for
other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff
must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal . . . or called into question by
a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
486-87 (1994); Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th
Cir. 1995); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648
(1997) (applying rule in § 1983 suit seeking declaratory