United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MICHAEL B. MOSLEY, Plaintiff,
DR. UNKNOWN FATOKI, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RICHARD WEBBER SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on Defendant Dr. Fatoki's
Motion for Summary Judgment , and Barb Odem, Lisa Miller,
and Melissa Plunkett's Motion for Summary Judgment .
Michael B. Mosley (“Plaintiff”) initiated this
lawsuit by filing a complaint in this Court on January 5,
2017, against Defendants Dr. Fatoki, Deputy Lisa Miller,
Melissa Plunkett, and Barbara Odem
(“Defendants”). Plaintiff alleged Defendants
failed to provide proper medical care causing cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. On May 9, 2017, this Court
denied Dr. Fatoki's Motion to Dismiss asserting Plaintiff
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
is an inmate at Ste. Genevieve County Jail (“the
jail”) and has been since September 29, 2016. Plaintiff
notified staff at the jail he had medical issues resulting in
unbearable pain. He was prescribed antibiotics and Motrin for
the first two weeks, ending on October 13, 2016. The pain
continued. On October 14, 2016, Plaintiff saw Dr. Fatoki for
a physical, who noted there was a metal plate exposed in
Plaintiff's jaw, but there was no evidence of an
infection; he ordered Plaintiff's ibuprofen prescription
be continued. On October 19, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a
healthcare request seeking to see a doctor because the
medication was not working. Plaintiff was seen by Defendant
Barbra Odem, LPN, the next day. On October 28, 2016,
Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Fatoki and he noted Plaintiff was
stable and not in distress. Further, Dr. Fatoki told
Plaintiff he needed oral surgery. It was also determined
Plaintiff had a broken tooth that had become infected and was
causing lacerations in his mouth. Plaintiff also had a
fractured wisdom tooth needing to be removed. Dr. Fatoki told
Plaintiff he would refer him to a dentist.
failing to be called to see a dentist, Plaintiff filed a
request for dental care. Plaintiff saw the dentist on
November 10, 2016, who told him he needed oral surgery and
could not provide the treatment. The dentist stated he would
provide Plaintiff with antibiotics due to the infection. On
November 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed a grievance asking for
immediate medical attention and medication. On November 19,
2016, Plaintiff filed a second grievance stating he was in
unbearable pain, could not eat or sleep, and needed medical
treatment. On November 22, 2016, Plaintiff was told to
continue his medication and an oral rinse lasting five days.
Gary Stolzer responded to Plaintiff's grievances on
November 23, 2016, stating Plaintiff needed to wait longer
for authorization from the United States Marshals to see an
oral surgeon and medical records had not yet been obtained.
On December 14, 2016, Plaintiff saw an oral surgeon, but
refused to allow the surgeon to remove the metal plate,
because he wanted his own oral surgeon to perform the
surgery. On December 28, 2016, Nurse Odem requested Plaintiff
be seen by the oral surgeon to remove the metal plate. On
January 11, 2017, Plaintiff was taken to the oral surgeon and
the metal plate was removed.
alleges Defendants failed to provide proper medical care,
because it was clear and evident there was a metal plate
exposed in Plaintiff's mouth, two broken teeth, clear
swelling, and obvious pain.
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a
motion for summary judgment only if all of the information
before the court shows “there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). “By its very terms, [Rule 56(c)(1)] provides
that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is
that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
247-48 (1986). Material facts are those “that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,
” and a genuine material fact is one “such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id. at 248. Further, if the non-moving
party has failed to “make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, ... there can be ‘no genuine issue as
to any material fact, ' since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
initial burden of proof in a motion for summary judgment is
placed on the moving party to establish “the
non-existence of any genuine issue of fact that is material
to a judgment in his favor.” City of Mt. Pleasant,
Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273
(8th Cir.1988). Once this burden is discharged, if the record
does in fact bear out that no genuine dispute exists, the
burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must set forth
affirmative evidence and specific facts showing there is a
genuine dispute on that issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
250; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). When the burden shifts, the
non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its
pleadings, but by affidavit and other evidence must set forth
specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Stone Motor Co. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 293 F.3d 456, 465 (8th Cir.2002). To meet
its burden, the non-moving party must “do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In fact,
the non-moving party must show there is sufficient evidence
favoring the non-moving party which would enable a jury to
return a verdict for it. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Celotex,
477 U.S. at 334. “If the non-moving party fails to
produce such evidence, summary judgment is proper.”
Olson v. Pennzoil Co., 943 F.2d 881, 883 (8th
Court may not “weigh the evidence in the summary
judgment record, decide credibility questions, or determine
the truth of any factual issue.” Kampouris v. St.
Louis Symphony Soc., 210 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir.2000).
The Court instead “perform[s] only a gatekeeper
function of determining whether there is evidence in the
summary judgment record generating a genuine issue of
material fact for trial on each essential element of a