United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
EDWARD AUTREY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, [Doc. No. 4]. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. For the
reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
filed this action in the Associate Circuit Court of St.
Charles County, Missouri alleging that Defendant violated
Section 1692e of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by
filing a lawsuit in violation of an Arbitration Agreement and
Waiver of Jury Trial entered into by the parties. Defendant
removed the matter to this Court based on the Court's
federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Petition alleges the following:
December 22, 2016, Defendant filed a lawsuit against
Plaintiff in the Associate Division of the Circuit Court of
St. Charles County. The lawsuit alleges that Plaintiff
executed and delivered to the Plaintiff in that case, OneMain
Financial Services, Inc. a promissory note on November 19,
2013, in the sum of $2, 676.75, plus interest. The promissory
note included an arbitration agreement and waiver of jury
Under this agreement, both lender and I are voluntarily
waiving any right to a jury or judge trial of all claims and
disputes covered by this arbitration agreement and waiver of
jury trial (“this Arbitration Agreement”) to the
fullest extent permitted by law.
The Arbitration Agreement also contains a section labeled
COVERED BY ARBITRATION:
Instead of pursuing arbitration, either Lender or I also have
the option to bring a lawsuit in court to seek to recover the
monetary jurisdictional limit of a small claims or equivalent
court in my state (including costs and attorneys' fees),
provided that no relief other than such recovery is requested
in such lawsuit.
alleges that the Missouri jurisdictional small claims amount
is $5, 000, that Defendant's suit seeks the sum of $2,
676.75 plus interest. Plaintiff further alleges that the
filing of the lawsuit by Defendant on behalf of One Main
violates the Arbitration Agreement, therefore, Defendant
violated the FDCPA by taking legal action that cannot be
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as
true the factual allegations in the complaint and construes
all reasonable inferences arising therefrom most favorably to
the plaintiff. Hager v. Ark. Dep't of Health,
735 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Gross v.
Weber, 186 F.3d 1089, 1090 (8th Cir. 1999)). The Court,
however, need not accept as true wholly conclusory
allegations, Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview
Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999), or legal
conclusions that plaintiffs draw from the facts pled.
Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th
Cir. 1990). In addition, the Court ordinarily does not
consider matters outside the pleadings on a motion to
dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The Court may,
however, consider exhibits attached to the complaint and
documents that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings,
Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n.4
(8th Cir. 2003), and may also consider public records,
Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007).
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint
need not contain “detailed factual allegations, ”
it must contain facts with enough specificity “to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Id. at 555. “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In ...