United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Northern Division
WILLIAM J. POPPE, Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, [1] Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER [2]
JOHN
M. BODENHAUSEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff
William J. Poppe (“Plaintiff”) appeals the
decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security
(“Defendant”) denying his applications for
disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security
Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et
seq., and supplemental security income under Title XVI,
see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq.
Substantial evidence supports the Acting Commissioner's
decision, and therefore it is affirmed. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.
Procedural History & Summary of Memorandum
Decision
On January 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed applications for
disability benefits, arguing that his disability began on
August 20, 2012, as a result of depression, hypertension,
degenerative disc disease, migraines, fibromyalgia, memory
loss, neck and back pain, numbness and tingling in his
extremities, and nausea.[3] (Tr. 486-93) On February 14, 2014,
Plaintiff's claims were denied upon initial
consideration. (Tr. 423-27) Plaintiff then requested a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). Plaintiff appeared at the hearing (with
counsel) on August 27, 2015, and testified concerning the
nature of his disability, his functional limitations, and his
past work. (Tr. 345-68) The ALJ also heard testimony on that
date from Bob Hammond, a vocational expert
(“VE”). (Tr. 369-73, 563-64) The VE opined as to
Plaintiff's ability to secure other work in the national
economy, based upon Plaintiff's functional limitations,
age, and education. (Id.) After taking
Plaintiff's testimony, considering the VE's
testimony, and reviewing the rest of the evidence of record,
the ALJ issued a decision on November 17, 2015, finding that
Plaintiff was not disabled, and therefore denying benefits.
(Tr. 14-24)
Plaintiff
sought review of the ALJ's decision before the Appeals
Council of the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”). (Tr. 1-6) On November 30, 2016, the
Appeals Council denied review of Plaintiff's claims,
making the November 2015 decision of the ALJ the final
decision of the Acting Commissioner. Plaintiff has therefore
exhausted his administrative remedies, and his appeal is
properly before this Court. See 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
In his
brief to this Court, Plaintiff raises one issue, the
ALJ's Residual Function Capacity determination is not
supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ failed to give controlling weight to his treating
physician Dr. Wendell Nickerson's opinions, and
challenges the ALJ's adverse credibility determination.
The Acting Commissioner filed a detailed brief in opposition
contending that the ALJ's decision is based on
substantial evidence.
As
explained below, the Court has considered the entire record
in this matter. Because the decision of the Acting
Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence, it will be
affirmed.
II.
The Hearing Before the ALJ
The ALJ
conducted a hearing on August 27, 2015. Plaintiff was present
with an attorney and testified at the hearing. The VE also
testified at the hearing. (Tr. 345-74)
A.
Plaintiff's Testimony
Plaintiff
began his testimony by noting that he is unable to drive
because he takes time released Morphine and Hydrocodone. (Tr.
352) Plaintiff is a high school graduate. Plaintiff's son
helps with his bills, and he receives food stamps. (Tr. 353)
Plaintiff testified that he last worked in 2010 as a long
haul truck driver. Plaintiff's work as a truck driver
required him to drive on the road five days a week. (Tr. 369)
Plaintiff has been disabled since August 2012 because of his
continuous pain caused by migraine headaches and
fibromyalgia. (Tr. 353-55)
Plaintiff
testified that he started experiencing migraine headaches as
a child and has been on medications for years. (Tr. 355-56)
Plaintiff experiences migraine headaches at least three times
a month, each lasting twenty-four hours. (Tr. 367) A
neurologist diagnosed Plaintiff with fibromyalgia in 2004,
and he has been treated with medications. (Tr. 356) Plaintiff
testified that he experiences pain across his extremities
every day and has had four strokes. (Tr. 357, 359) Plaintiff
testified that he has degenerative disc arthritis in his neck
and arthritis in his back, and he takes medications for these
conditions. (Tr. 358-59) Plaintiff has an enlarged heart and
has been wearing a halter monitor for three months. (Tr. 361)
Plaintiff takes a fifteen to thirty minute nap once or twice
a day because of his fatigue. (Tr. 365-66)
Plaintiff
testified that he can only stand for five to ten minutes.
(Tr. 357) Plaintiff can walk a block before he needs to take
a break. (Tr. 358) Plaintiff uses crutches. (Tr. 367)
Plaintiff
testified that he experiences swelling in his feet every
three to four weeks lasting for three to four days. (Tr. 363)
Plaintiff takes medication and elevates his feet in a
recliner for most of the day. (Tr. 363-64)
B.
The VE's Testimony
The VE
testified regarding Plaintiff's work history and his
current ability to work.
The ALJ
asked the VE a series of hypothetical questions to determine
whether someone Plaintiff's age, education, work
experience, and specific functional limitations would be able
to find a job in the local or national economy. (Tr. 370) The
VE responded that such a hypothetical person would be able to
perform the light job duties of a cashier II, a
housekeeper/maid, and an extrusion press operator. (Tr. 371)
The ALJ next asked whether an inability to sit, stand, and
walk for a total of eight hours a workday and the need to lie
down during the workday would preclude employment. (Tr. 372)
The VE advised that such limitations would preclude work. The
ALJ further asked whether the need to take unscheduled
fifteen minute breaks or to be off task for at least 15
percent of the workday would preclude employment. The VE
indicated that such individual would not be able to maintain
employment. (Tr. 372) Last, the ALJ asked whether the need to
be absent or leave work early at least two times a month
would preclude employment. The VE advised that the inability
to maintain a normal work schedule would preclude employment.
(Tr. 373)
III.
The ALJ's Decision
In a
decision dated November 17, 2015, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act.
(Tr. 14-24) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had severe
impairments of cervical degenerative disc disease,
fibromyalgia, osteoarthritis, and obstructive sleep apnea;
and non-severe impairments of strokes, cardiac impairment,
hypertension, depression, obesity, and migraines. (Tr. 17-18)
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the
following modifications: he could not climb ladders, ropes,
and scaffolds; he could occasionally climb stairs and ramps;
he could occasionally stoop, kneel, crawl, and crouch; and he
must avoid hazards such as unprotected heights and moving and
dangerous machinery and concentrated exposure to pulmonary
irritants such as dust, fumes, and gases. (Tr. 17)
The ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff could not return to his past
relevant work as a truck driver. (Tr. 22) Based on
hypothetical questions posed to the VE, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning of
the Social Security Act because someone with his age,
education and functional limitations could perform other work
that existed in substantial numbers in the national economy.
(Tr. 23)
The
ALJ's decision is discussed in greater detail below in
the context of the issues Plaintiff has raised in this
matter.
IV.
Standard of Review and Legal Framework
“To
be eligible for … benefits, [Plaintiff] must prove
that [he] is disabled ….” Baker v. Sec'y
of Health and Human Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir.
1992); see also Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d
1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001). Under the Act, a disability is
defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c (a)(3)(A). A
plaintiff will be found to have a disability “only if
[his] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of
such severity that [he] is not only unable to do [her]
previous work but cannot, considering [his] age, education
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(B). See also
Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987).
Per
regulations promulgated by the Commissioner, 20 C.F.R §
404.1520, “[t]he ALJ follows ‘the familiar
five-step process' to determine whether an individual is
disabled…. The ALJ consider[s] whether: (1) the
claimant was employed; (2) [he] was severely impaired; (3)
[his] impairment was, or was comparable to, a listed
impairment; (4) [he] could perform past relevant work; and if
not, (5) whether [he] could perform any other kind of
work.” Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 921
(8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Halverson v. Astrue, 600
F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010)). See also Bowen, 482
U.S. at 140-42 (explaining the five-step process).
The
Eighth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that a district
court's review of an ALJ's disability determination
is intended to be narrow and that courts should “defer
heavily to the findings and conclusions of the Social
Security Administration.” Hurd v. Astrue, 621
F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Howard v.
Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 2001)). The
ALJ's findings should be affirmed if they are supported
by “substantial evidence” on the record as a
whole. See Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th
Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence is “less than a
preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind might accept
it as adequate to support a decision.” Juszczyk v.
Astrue, 542 F.3d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 2008); see also
Wildman v. Astrue, 964 F.3d 959, 965 (8th Cir. 2010)
(same).
Despite
this deferential stance, a district court's review must
be “more than an examination of the record for the
existence of substantial evidence in support of the
Commissioner's decision.” Beckley v.
Apfel, 152 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1998). The district
court must “also take into account whatever in the
record fairly detracts from that decision.”
Id. Specifically, in reviewing the
Commissioner's decision, a district court is required to
examine the entire administrative record and consider:
1. The credibility findings made by the ALJ.
2. The claimant's vocational factors.
3. The medical evidence from treating and consulting
physicians.
4. The claimant's subjective complaints relating to
exertional and non-exertional activities and impairments.
5. Any corroboration by third parties of the claimant's
impairments.
6. The testimony of vocational experts, when required, which
is based upon a proper hypothetical question which sets forth
...