United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on remand from the Eighth Circuit.
Plaintiff Ronald Calzone claims RSMo. § 304.230 is
unconstitutional as applied to him-a farmer who occasionally
operates his 56, 000-pound dump truck only in the State of
Missouri- because he is not a member of the closely regulated
commercial trucking industry. The parties have renewed their
motions for summary judgment. Because the Court finds Calzone
is a member of the closely regulated commercial trucking
industry, his motion for summary judgment (#14) is denied and
the state's motion for summary judgment (#10) is granted.
Factual and Procedural Background
is a Missouri farmer who occasionally operates his dump truck
no more than fifty miles from his farm. The dump truck is
licensed with a Missouri 54, 000-pound local license plate
that is marked with the letter F, which designates the dump
truck as a farm truck. The truck does not have a U.S.
Department of Transportation number on it. Calzone is not a
professional truck driver, and he uses the dump truck only
when transporting agricultural products or supplies to and
from his farm.
2013, a Missouri State Highway Patrol corporal stopped
Calzone while he was driving his dump truck on the highway.
The corporal told Calzone that he pulled him over because he
“did not recognize the truck or the markings displayed
on the vehicle” and asked to inspect it. Calzone
refused, and the corporal then explained that RSMo. §
304.230 authorized him to stop commercial vehicles and
inspect them whether or not he had probable cause. The
corporal warned Calzone if he did not submit to an
inspection, he would issue Calzone a citation. Calzone still
refused, so the corporal issued him a citation for failing to
submit to a commercial vehicle inspection. The Phelps County
prosecutor later abandoned the action against Calzone.
then sued the governor of Missouri, the Missouri attorney
general, and the superintendent of the Missouri State Highway
Patrol under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sought a declaratory
judgment that § 304.230.1, .2, and .7 are
unconstitutional on their face and as applied to him. He
asked for a permanent injunction against the enforcement of
these provisions, one dollar in nominal damages, and costs
and attorney's fees. Although the Fourth Amendment
prohibits unreasonable searches and searches, not all
warrantless seizures are unreasonable. In fact, warrantless
inspections involving closely regulated industries are
constitutional when certain conditions are met. New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987). As such, this
Court held the challenged provisions were not facially
unconstitutional, because they could be applied
constitutionally to participants in the closely regulated
commercial trucking industry. This Court also held
Calzone's as-applied challenge must fail because he named
as parties the governor, attorney general, and
superintendent, instead of the corporal who pulled him over.
Eighth Circuit affirmed this Court's conclusion that the
challenged provisions are not facially unconstitutional.
Calzone v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir.
2017). It also affirmed this Court's conclusion that the
governor and attorney general were improper parties for
Calzone's as-applied challenge. Id. at 872. But
the Eighth Circuit held “Calzone can sue the
superintendent in her official capacity for declaratory and
injunctive relief[.]” Id. It remanded so this
Court could address the merits of Calzone's as-applied
challenge. The Eighth Circuit listed two questions this Court
may need to consider to resolve the as-applied challenge: (1)
“whether Missouri's incorporation of the federal
regulations also incorporates the exceptions for farm
vehicles that are contained within those federal regulations,
or whether Missouri's own exceptions at §
307.400.1(2) and .5 are exclusive” and (2)
“whether a partial exemption from the federal
regulations removes an operator from the realm of the closely
regulated commercial trucking industry.” Id.
Summary Judgment Standard
to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
district court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all
of the information before the court demonstrates that
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962). This Court must construe the facts
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but it
need not accept a version of the events that “is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable
jury could believe it.” Marksmeier v. Davie,
622 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
makes three arguments for why the challenged subsections of
§ 304.230 are unconstitutional as applied to him. The
Court will address each separately.
Even Though Calzone Is Not Engaged in a Business Tied to
the Professional Commercial Trucking
Industry, He Is Still Subject to the Commercial Motor Vehicle
Calzone claims he is not subject to the Fourth
Amendment's closely regulated industry exception because
he is not engaged in any business tied to the commercial
trucking industry. The Eighth Circuit has made clear the
commercial trucking, itself, is a closely regulated industry.
Calzone, 866 F.3d at 871. But Calzone argues he is
not a professional truck driver, so he hasn't voluntarily
given up Fourth Amendment rights like those who choose a
career in professional truck driving.
Court rejected this argument when first ruling on summary
judgment: “Although [Calzone] was not a long-haul
common carrier . . ., the fact that [he] was driving his dump
trunk (and not a tractor-trailer filled with goods for sale)
is not relevant to the statute or to the officers who enforce
it.” (#27 at 8.) This Court also observed Calzone held
a “commercial” driver's license and his truck
was registered for “local commercial” use.
Finally, § 302.010 defines “commercial motor
vehicle” as “a motor vehicle designed or
regularly used for carrying freight and merchandise[.]”
This Court concluded “regardless of to what use
[Calzone] put the dump truck, the dump truck was
‘designed' for carrying freight and was in fact
registered as a ‘commercial' vehicle. [Calzone] was