United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
L. WHITE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Jason
Monroe, an inmate at Farmington Correctional Center, for
leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the
required filing fee. Having reviewed the motion and the
financial information submitted in support, the Court
assesses a partial initial filing fee of $36.23, which is
twenty percent of his average monthly deposit. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Additionally, plaintiff will be
required to amend his complaint on a court-provided form
within thirty (30) days of the date of this Memorandum and
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil
action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount
of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in
his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must
assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average
monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the
average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the
prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial
filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments
of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to
the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The
agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these
monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount
in the prisoner's account exceeds $10.00, until the
filing fee is fully paid. Id.
has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison
account statement for the six-month period immediately
preceding the submission of his complaint. A review of
plaintiffs account indicates an average monthly deposit of
$181.16. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial
partial filing fee of $36.23.
Standard on Initial Review
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss
a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a
complaint must plead more than "legal conclusions"
and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action [that are] supported by mere conclusory
statements." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim
for relief, which is more than a "mere possibility of
misconduct." Id. at 679. "A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to, inter alia, draw
upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at
complaints are to be liberally construed. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). However, they still
must allege sufficient facts to support the claims alleged.
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir.
2004); see also Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282,
1286 (8th Cir. 1980) (even pro se complaints are required to
allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a
matter of law). Federal courts are not required to
"assume facts that are not alleged, just because an
additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger
complaint." Stone, 364 F.3d at 914-15. In
addition, giving a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal
construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary
civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v.
U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113(1993).
is an inmate at Farmington Correctional Center. He brings
this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
seventeen (17) different defendants. He sues all defendants
in their individual and official capacities.
alleges that the mail censorship procedures at Farmington
Correctional Center are in violation of plaintiff s First
Amendment rights, "overbroad and restrictive" and
go "far beyond a valid penological interest."
Plaintiff appears to be asserting that not only is the policy
in violation of the First Amendment as written, but it is
also in violation of the Constitution as applied. He asserts
that it also censors legal mail, as well as pictures and
printed materials inmates have in their cells. Just on behalf
of this one claim, plaintiff names almost all of the
defendants as having applied the policy to him, but he has
not alleged when each defendant purportedly acted. He also
appears to be asserting a policy and practice claim with
regard to his First Amendment claim, and he has also
generally mentioned that some of the defendants are
responsible for a failure to train claim as a result of this
unnecessarily overbroad and restrictive policy.
II appears to be against defendant Kristin Johnson and
purports to allege an Eighth-Amendment violation for
subjecting plaintiff to disciplinary segregation for a
purported mental health disability. Plaintiff has not alleged
when this purportedly occurred.
III lies against defendant Coel Jackson, and purportedly
occurred on December 2, 2016, when plaintiff states defendant
Jackson violated his Eighth Amendment rights by giving him a
conduct violation for failing to provide him with a urine
specimen in spite of the fact that plaintiff had a known
Count IV, plaintiff alleges that defendant Brawley and
defendant Clubb subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment
by allowing a subordinate to question plaintiff about his
failure to produce a urine specimen. Plaintiff also asserts
that Director Precythe failed to train her officers in the
correct procedures of collecting urine specimens.
Count V, plaintiff alleges that defendant Anita Clarke failed
to provide him effective medical care even after the
Paruresis Foundation sent ...