United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
AUDREY
G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This
matter is before the Court on the petition of Missouri state
prisoner Brian Williams for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below,
federal habeas relief will be denied.
BACKGROUND
On
February 27, 2009, Petitioner pled guilty in Missouri state
court to charges in two separate cases: In Case No.
07SL-CR04300-01 (hereinafter, “CR04300-01”),
Petitioner pled guilty to one count of second-degree murder
(Count I), one related count of armed criminal action
(“ACA”) (Count II), three counts of first-degree
assault (Counts III, V, and VII), and three counts,
respectively, of ACA (IV, VI, and VIII). All charges arose
out of the August 25, 2007 shooting death of one victim and
the shooting of three other victims in the same gang-related
shooting spree. In exchange for his guilty plea, the
prosecutor had amended Count I from first-degree murder to
second-degree murder, and also amended Count II, accordingly.
In Case No. 08SL-CR03262-01 (hereinafter,
“CR03262-01”), Petitioner pled guilty to three
counts of first-degree robbery and three counts of ACA. These
crimes involved three different victims and were unrelated to
the crimes charged in CR4300-01.
At the
guilty plea and sentencing hearing, Petitioner confirmed that
he had sufficient time to discuss the case with his attorney,
and that he understood the rights he was giving up by
pleading guilty. The prosecutor outlined a factual basis for
the pleas and Petitioner affirmed that the facts as set forth
by the prosecutor were true. The prosecutor then reviewed the
range of punishment for each crime, as follows: “The
range of punishment . . . for the murder in the second degree
was 10 to 30 years or life imprisonment. Regarding assault in
the first degree those also contain the range of punishment
of 10 to 30 years. And the armed criminal action is a minimum
of three years with a maximum of life imprisonment.”
ECF No. 12-3 at 50. The prosecutor explained that the
State's recommended punishment as to CR04300-01 was life
imprisonment on Count I, a concurrent term of life on Count
II, and 25 years on each of Counts III-VIII to be served
concurrent to one another, but consecutive to the life
sentences on Counts I and II, for “a total of life plus
25 years.” As to CR03262-01, the prosecutor stated that
the recommended sentences of 20 years on each count
“would run concurrent to one another and concurrent to
the life sentences that the Court will be imposing [in
CR04300-01].” Id. at 51.
Petitioner
confirmed that the prosecutor's recitation matched his
“understanding of what the State recommended in both of
[his] cases.” Id. Petitioner then pled guilty
to all of the charged offenses and the court accepted the
pleas as voluntarily and intelligently made with a full
understanding of the charges and consequences of the pleas.
Consistent with the parties' recommendations, the court
sentenced Petitioner in CR04300-01 to life imprisonment for
murder in the second degree; life imprisonment for the
related ACA; and 25 years for each count of assault in the
first degree and each remaining count of ACA. The court
ordered the sentences on Counts I and II to run concurrently
with each other, and the remaining sentences to run
concurrently with each other, but consecutively to Counts I
and II.
The
court sentenced Petitioner in CR03262-01 to 20 years for each
count and ordered the sentences to run concurrently with all
of the other sentences. After sentencing, Petitioner
expressed satisfaction with counsel's representation and
stated that the sentences imposed were the result of a plea
bargain. Id. at 53.
State
Post-Conviction Proceedings
The
only claim Petitioner raised in his amended motion for
postconviction relief was that his plea was involuntary and
“must be withdrawn” because plea counsel failed
to explain the “details and consequences of the life
sentence and consecutive time.” ECF No. 12-3 at 78. He
asserted that his plea counsel did not “explain what a
life sentence for murder meant, ” but rather
“told him that life meant thirty years and he would be
eligible for parole after a certain number of years, [and
that Petitioner] did not understand that he would be forced
to serve more than thirty years at the most.”
Petitioner alleged that he did not know that he would be
subject to § 558.019.3, Mo. Rev. Stat., [1] pursuant to
which he would have to serve 85 percent of the life sentence
and 85% percent of the 25 year sentences, for a total of 46
and ¾ years before being eligible for parole.
Petitioner alleged that had he known he would have to serve
“this extended amount of time, ” he would not
have pled guilty, and would have insisted upon a trial. In
sum, Petitioner claimed that plea counsel actions in
“misadvising him about the amount of time [Petitioner]
would have to serve before becoming eligible for
parole” deprived him of his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 80.
The
motion court denied Petitioner's request for an
evidentiary hearing and rejected this claim. The court held
that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence of a
guilty plea and, under although under Missouri law, plea
counsel and the trial court have “a duty not to
affirmatively misinform [a defendant] of the
consequences of his plea, ” there was “no
evidence of affirmative misinformation in this case.”
Id. at 93-94.
In
affirming the motion court's decision, the Missouri Court
of Appeals held that the motion court's finding that
counsel was not obligated to advise Petitioner about parole
eligibility, a collateral consequence of pleading guilty, was
not clearly erroneous. ECF No.12-4 at 7. The appellate court
cited § 558.019, and reasoned as follows:
[E]ven if counsel advised Movant in terms of the
“number of years” he should expect to serve for
murder, the allegation in Movant's amended motion did not
show that counsel misinformed Movant about parole eligibility
on his life sentence for murder. Moreover, the record shows
that Movant was aware that he would receive additional
sentences of twenty-five years, and that those sentences
would run consecutively to his life sentences, meaning that
his total sentence would be “life plus 25 years.”
At his plea Subsection 4 provides that for the purpose of
determining the minimum prison term to be served, “A
sentence of life shall be calculated to be thirty
years.” hearing, Movant assured the court that he
understood the terms of the plea agreement and he did not
allege in his amended motion that counsel misadvised him
about the meaning of consecutive sentences or the length of
time he would have to serve before being eligible for parole
on all of his sentences.
Id.
Federal
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