United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Southern Division
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE.
this Court is Plaintiff Jason Thomas Piel
(“Plaintiff”)'s Pro Se Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order (doc. 34) (“Motion”). Despite
the title, the Motion will be construed as a motion for
preliminary injunction. For the following reasons, the Motion
argues he was discriminated against when he was punished on
two different occasions for the same violation and believes
he will be discriminated against without the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. (Id.) First, Officer
Tscherny observed Plaintiff stealing a non-kosher side dish
in the cafeteria on September 30, 2017, and as a result,
Plaintiff was placed in segregation for twenty-four hours.
(Id.) After this incident, Captain Johnson reviewed
jail security footage and determined Plaintiff consumed and
traded non-kosher food items on eight occasions during the
week of September 24, 2017, through September 30, 2017,
violating Greene County Justice Center Rules #304 and
#325. (Id.) Captain Johnson placed
Plaintiff in administrative detention for fifteen (15) days
for these violations. (Id.)
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and the
burden of establishing the propriety of an injunction is on
the movant.” Roudachevski v. All-Am. Care Centers,
Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 2011); see also
Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)
(“A court issues a preliminary injunction in a lawsuit
to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until
the court has an opportunity to rule on the lawsuit's
merits.”). The Eighth Circuit considers applications
for preliminary injunctions based on the following factors:
(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff, (2) the
state of balance between such harm and the injury that
granting the injunction will inflict on other parties
litigant, (3) the probability the plaintiff will succeed on
the merits, and (4) the public interest. Dataphase
Systems, Inc. v. C.L. Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114
(8th Cir. 1981). No one factor is determinative and all
factors are considered together; however, the plaintiff's
likelihood of success on the merits is weighted most
significantly in the analysis. Id. at 113.
Additionally, a court cannot issue an injunction against
non-parties unless they are “in active concert or
participation” with a party or a party's officers,
agents, servants, employees, or attorneys. Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin “officers, agents, and
employees of Greene County Justice Center.” Plaintiff
does not allege the “officers, agents, and employees of
Greene County Justice Center” acted in concert with a
party to this lawsuit. Alternatively, to the extent Plaintiff
is seeking an injunction against the Defendants in this case,
Plaintiff does not allege any actions taken by Defendants and
instead alleges actions taken by Officer Tscherny and Captain
Johnson, neither of which are named as Defendants in this
case. Therefore, the Court cannot enjoin these non-parties.
Thus, the Motion is denied.
Plaintiff's motion was not denied as outlined above, it
would be denied on the merits. The Plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing the necessity for a preliminary injunction,
and Plaintiff has not met this burden. Baker v. Electric
Co-op, Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1472 (8th Cir.
1994). The central issue is “whether the balance of
equities so favors the movant that justice requires the court
to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits are
determined.” Dataphase Systems Inc., 640 F.2d
at 113. See White v. Nix, 7 F.3d 120, 121 (8th Cir.
1993) (an inmate does not have a constitutional right to
remain in general prison population); Clark v.
Browers, 2005 WL 1926088, *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2005)
(an inmate's motion for a temporary restraining order was
denied because the inmate “does not have a right to be
held in the institution of his choosing”). Here, after
considering the above factors, the balance of equities does
not require the Court to intervene.
Plaintiff's Motion (doc. 34) construed as a motion for
preliminary injunction is DENIED.
IS SO ORDERED.
 Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b), a
temporary restraining order may be issued without notice to
the adverse party or its attorney and expires fourteen (14)
days after issuance. Because Plaintiff seeks relief for
longer than fourteen days and Defendants have received notice
and an opportunity to respond to the Motion, the Court will
construe the motion as a request for preliminary injunction.
See Sampson v. Murray, 94 S.Ct. 937, 951 (1974)
(“a temporary restraining order continued beyond the
time permissible under Rule 65 must be treated as a
preliminary injunction, and must conform to the standards
applicable to preliminary injunctions”). Finally, the
Court liberally construes a document filed by a pro se
litigant. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (“A document filed pro se is “to be
liberally construed” and “must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
 Greene County Justice Center Rule #304
prohibits the possession of anything not authorized for
retention or receipt by the inmate and not issued through
regular channels. Greene County Justice Center Rule #325
prohibits giving money or anything of value from ...