United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CRITES-LEONI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Timothy Barr, currently an inmate at the Jefferson City
Correctional Center (“JCCC”), brought this action
pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
his constitutional rights were violated during his
incarceration at Southeast Correctional Center
(“SECC”). This matter is before the Court on
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 70.) For
the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Amended Complaint, Barr seeks monetary and declaratory relief
against the following SECC and/or Corizon, Inc. employees in
both their official and individual capacities: Nurse Rebecca
Pearson,  Nurse Dana Degens, Nurse Brandi Juden,
Nurse David Helman, J. Cofield (Director of Operations), Dr.
Mina Massey (Medical Director), Dr. G. Babich, Dr. Kimberly
Birch, and Nurse Practitioner Nina Hill. (Doc. 34.) Barr
alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs at SECC following a diagnosis of
multiple sclerosis (“MS”). Specifically, Barr
contends that Defendants intentionally delayed treatment,
failed to provide necessary medical treatment, and improperly
administered prescribed medication. Id. at 9. As a
result, Barr contends that he has suffered harmful side
effects and symptoms, including confinement in a wheelchair.
their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that
there are no genuine issues of material fact, and they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because Barr's
allegations of deliberate indifference are unsupported. Barr
has filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 83), and Defendants have filed a
Reply (Doc. 86).
Summary Judgment Standard
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a district court
may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the
information before the court demonstrates that “there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The burden is on the moving party. City of Mt. Pleasant,
Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op. Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273
(8th Cir. 1988). After the moving party discharges this
burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there
is some doubt as to the facts. Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986). A genuine issue of material fact is not the
“mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties.” State Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Lawrence, 358 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir. 2004).
“Instead, the dispute must be outcome determinative
under prevailing law.” Mosley v. City of
Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotations omitted). A fact is material when it
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Barr's status as a
pro se prisoner does not excuse him from responding
to Defendants' Motion “with specific factual
support for his claims to avoid summary judgment, ” or
from complying with local rules. Beck v. Skon, 253
F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 2001).
was at all times relevant to his Complaint incarcerated
within the Missouri Department of Corrections
(“MDOC”) at SECC. Corizon, LLC
(“Corizon”), the employer of the named
Defendants, was under contract with the State of Missouri to
provide medical care and treatment to offenders incarcerated
within the MDOC.
21, 2014, Barr was diagnosed with having MS by Dr. Sudhir
Batchu, pursuant to Dr. Batchu's assessment and review of
an MRI. Dr. Batchu recommended that Barr start Avonex, be
given Aleve with the onset of side effects typically caused
by Avonex, and follow-up with Dr. Batchu in three months. Dr.
Batchu gave Barr an information packet that consisted of
informational paperwork, a USB drive, and a pen. Defendants
describe the pen as an ink pen containing an advertisement on
the outside of the pen. Barr contends the pen was not an ink
pen but was an “Avonex pen, ” containing a dosage
of the drug. Defendants state that the informational
paperwork was returned to Barr, but the remaining items were
not returned as Barr was not allowed to have the items within
the facility. Barr argues that all of the items were taken
and thrown away by Rebecca Pearson.
22, 2014, Defendant Massey placed a request to allow Barr to
see Dr. Batchu for a follow-up appointment in three months,
which was approved by the Regional Medical Director on May
23, 2014. On May 27, 2014, Defendant Massey prescribed Avonex
for Plaintiff pursuant to Dr. Batchu's recommendation.
Barr was given injections of Avonex by nurses at SECC,
including Defendants Degens and Helman, on the following
dates: June 11, 2014, June 18, 2014, July 2, 2014, July 9,
2014, July 23, 2014, and July 30, 2014. Avonex injections
were administered on additional dates by Corizon nurses not
named as defendants in this matter. Defendants state that the
injections were administered in Barr's right or left
deltoid, whereas Barr disputes this fact, and claims that the
injections were administered to his biceps.
Hill met with Barr on October 10, 2014, to provide Barr with
additional information regarding Avonex injection treatment
and MS. Barr reported experiencing side effects, including
facial numbness, on this date. He did not receive any further
Avonex injections at SECC after October 10, 2014.
indifference” to a prisoner's serious illness or
injury constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976); Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 417 (8th
Cir. 2000) (“It is well established that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment extends
to protect prisoners from deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.”). “Deliberate indifference has
both an objective and a subjective component.”
Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir.
2006). The objective component requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate an objectively serious medical need. Grayson
v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 808-09 (8th Cir. 2006); Moore
v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1997), which
is one “that either has been diagnosed by a physician
as requiring ...