Court of Appeals of Missouri, Southern District, First Division
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DENT COUNTY Honorable Sidney T.
found Tylor Scott Derennaux ("Defendant") guilty of
arson and two burglaries in the second degree for events
occurring in April 2014 near Davisville. See 569.050
and 569.170. Defendant was sentenced to a total of
11-years imprisonment based upon consecutive sentences of two
years on each burglary count and seven years on the arson
three points relied on, Defendant challenges his judgment of
conviction and sentence by claiming: (1) the trial court
"clearly erred in overruling [Defendant's] motion to
suppress the cameras seized from him during an unlawful
detention"; (2) the trial court "plainly
erred" by "excluding the option of a 1-year prison
sentence" in the jury instructions on the burglary
counts; and (3) the trial court erred in "overruling
[Defendant's] objection" to the State's
sentencing-phase rebuttal closing argument that Defendant,
"'up to this point in time, as we stand here, has
not taken responsibility for what he did[.]'"
no merit in any of these claims, we affirm.
Principles of Review and Governing Law
that were not preserved may be reviewed for plain error only,
which requires the reviewing court to find that manifest
injustice or a miscarriage of justice has resulted from the
trial court error." State v Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d
600, 607 (Mo. banc 2009); see also Rule 30.20.
Plain-error relief requires "evident, obvious, and
clear" error and a resulting manifest injustice or
miscarriage of justice. Id. at 607-08 (quotation
that the issue has been preserved,
[a] trial court's rulings on closing argument are
reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Mahurin, 799 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Mo. banc 1990). To
constitute reversible error, there must be both an abuse of
discretion by the trial court and prejudice to the defendant
as a result of such abuse.
State v. Gilmore, 22 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Mo. App. W.D.
points do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions, and we limit our evidentiary summary
to matters relevant to the points, "view[ing] the facts
and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the verdict[s]." State v. Salazar,
414 S.W.3d 606, 610 n.2 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013). We begin our
analysis of each point with the factual and procedural
history relevant to that particular point.
1-The Two Cameras
Black and a female juvenile ("Juvenile") testified
at Defendant's July 2016 trial that they were walking
down Highway 49 with Defendant on the night of April 17,
2014. Trishia Hicks,  a volunteer firefighter, was driving
Highway 49 sometime around midnight when she passed Juvenile
and two men about a mile from where, some 90 minutes later,
she would be dispatched to help fight a fire. Juvenile waved
her hands to stop Ms. Hicks and asked her to take the trio to
Cherryville. Ms. Hicks refused because Cherryville was in the
opposite direction from where she was headed, and she could
smell alcohol on the group.
after midnight, Melba Martin heard popping sounds and
observed that the neighboring mobile home that belonged to
her daughter and son-in-law ("the Tricamos") was on
fire. Ms. Martin also saw several items from the mobile home
scattered in the yard, and she discovered that a door to a
farmhouse on the Tricamos' property had been kicked in.
Nothing was amiss with the Tricamo property when Ms. Martin
had checked it earlier in the evening.
Ms. Hicks was dispatched to fight the fire, she informed her
assistant chief about the people she had seen in the road.
That information was passed on to Sheriff's Deputy Frank
Williams, and he responded to the scene. Deputy Williams
left the scene of the fire around 4:30 a.m., and he stopped
when he saw Defendant and Juvenile walking in the road.
Defendant was not wearing a coat, and Juvenile was not
wearing shoes. Deputy Williams could smell alcohol on
Defendant's breath as he spoke with him. Deputy Williams
asked Defendant how old he was, and Defendant replied,
"'[W]hat difference does it make?'"
Defendant also said, "'I could've spilled beer
Williams "noticed that there were some bulging items in
[Defendant's] pocket, so [the deputy] asked him what they
were and [Defendant] told [the deputy] they were
cameras." The deputy had Defendant take the cameras out
of his pocket, and when asked if they were his cameras,
Defendant said he had received them as a gift from his
grandmother. Deputy Williams had Defendant get into the
officer's patrol car, and he gave Defendant a
Miranda warning. The deputy seized the cameras as
evidence. At a later time, Mr. Tricamo identified the cameras
as his property.
filed motions to suppress the statements he made to law
enforcement officers, "the two cameras allegedly found
on [D]efendant's person, " and any testimony
relating to the cameras ("the suppression
motions"). Following a hearing and briefing by counsel,
the trial court denied the suppression motions.
did not object at trial to testimony from Deputy Williams or
Mr. Tricamo regarding the cameras. And when the prosecutor
offered the cameras into evidence, defense counsel
affirmatively stated, "No objection." Defendant
filed a motion for new trial ("new trial motion")
that stated that "[a]ll pretrial motions and oral
arguments made during trial are incorporated by reference and
included herein[, ]" but it made no other specific
reference to the suppression motions or the cameras. In
arguing the new trial motion, defense counsel did not
specifically address either the suppression motions or the
Defendant acknowledges that he "did not object to the
admission of the cameras at trial[, ]" he maintains that
the new trial motion incorporated "all pretrial motions
and oral arguments made on those motions[, ]" and he
asks us to review the suppression ruling for "clear
error." The State maintains that Defendant waived any
claims regarding the cameras as evidence because he did not
renew the suppression motions at trial and defense counsel
stated "'[n]o objection'" when they were
offered into evidence. We agree.
trial objection to the admission of evidence challenged in a
motion to suppress is required to preserve the issue for
appellate review." State v. Lloyd, 205 S.W.3d
893, 900 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006). "The defendant cannot
resurrect [an] abandoned issue in his motion for new trial
after already allowing it to die at trial for lack of proper
objection." State v. Overstreet, 694 S.W.2d
491, 494 (Mo. App. E.D. 1985). "Under such
circumstances, 'even plain error review is not
warranted.'" Lloyd, 205 S.W.3d at 901
(quoting State v. Markham, 63 S.W.3d 701, 707-08
(Mo. App. S.D. 2002)). Point 1 is denied.
2-Sentencing Instructions for the Burglaries
claims the trial court committed plain error when it
instructed the jury that the burglary "sentences must be
either '2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7' years, excluding the
option of a 1-year prison sentence" for each of
the burglary counts because a one-year sentence is the
authorized minimum sentence for Class C felonies and "if
the jury had been properly instructed, there is a reasonable
probability it would have imposed a sentence of one ...