United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
TIMOTHY D. JOHNSON, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
EDWARD AUTREY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on petitioner's application
for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus
Cases in the United States District Courts provides that a
district court shall summarily dismiss a habeas corpus
petition if it plainly appears that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief. As set forth in detail below,
petitioner's claims will be denied, and no certificate of
appealability shall issue.
February 17, 2016, while on supervised release under docket
number United States v. Johnson, No. 4:12-CR-0335
HEA (E.D.Mo.), petitioner was arrested for a parole violation
and returned to the custody of the Missouri Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”) under State v.
Johnson, Case No. 1222-CR04103-01 (22nd
Judicial Circuit, St. Louis City). At this point, the State of
Missouri had primary jurisdiction over petitioner. See,
e.g., United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897
(8th Cir. 2005) (“As between the state and
federal sovereigns, primary jurisdiction over a person is
generally determined by which one first obtains custody of,
or arrests, the person.”).
4, 2016, petitioner was transferred on a writ ad
prosequendum from the custody of the MDOC to the custody
of the United States Marshals Service to appear for a
revocation hearing in United States v. Johnson, No.
4:12-CR-0335 HEA (E.D. Mo).
28, 2016, petitioner received a ten (10) month sentence of
imprisonment for his revocation in United States v.
Johnson, No. 4:12-CR-0335 HEA (E.D. Mo). At that time,
the Court ordered the sentence to run consecutive to
petitioner's sentence in his state case in State v.
Johnson, Case No. 1222-CR04103-01 (22nd
Judicial Circuit, St. Louis City).
2254 supplies federal jurisdiction over habeas petitions
filed by the inmates challenging their state convictions or
sentences, or the execution of those state sentences,
including the issues of parole, term calculation, etc. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254. In contrast, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241
and 2255 confer jurisdiction over the petitions filed by
“[t]he exact interplay between § 2241 and §
2255 is complicated, [and] an explication of that
relationship is unnecessary for resolution of this [case],
” Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d
Cir.2012) (citing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245,
249 (3d Cir.1997)), it is enough to state that
“[m]otions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can
challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly
in violation of the Constitution.” Okereke v.
United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir.2002).
example, claims attacking plea agreements are raised in
§ 2255 motions. See, e.g., Hodge v. United
States, 554 F.3d 372, 374 (3d Cir.2009); United
States v. Williams, 158 F.3d 736, 737-40 (3d
Cir.1998). On the other hand, § 2241
“confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a
federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the
execution of his sentence, ” for instance, by raising
claims attacking the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
calculation of his prison term or designation of his place of
confinement if it yields a “quantum of change” in
the level of his custody. Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir.2005)
(quoting Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d
Cir.2001)); compare Ganim v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 235 Fed.Appx. 882 (3d Cir.2007) (a change in
the geographical locale of imprisonment cannot yield the
requisite quantum of change).
is challenging the execution of his federal and state
sentences. Specifically, petitioner is asserting that he
believes his federal revocation sentence of 10 months should
have started immediately after his June 28, 2016 sentencing
date in this Court. However, according to petitioner, he has
still not been released into the Bureau of Prisons custody in
order to start his federal sentence. Rather, petitioner is
currently serving his state prison time in the Eastern
Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center
Petitioner's Claims Relating to the Primary
to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, service of a federal
sentence generally commences when the United States
government takes primary jurisdiction and a prisoner is
presented to serve his federal sentence, not when the United
States takes physical custody of a prisoner who is subject to
another sovereign's primary jurisdiction. See United
States v. Hayes, 535 F.3d 907, 909-10 (8th
Cir. 2008); see also, 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a)
(“A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the
date the defendant is received in custody awaiting
transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service
of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the
sentence is to be served.”); Binford v. United
States, 436 F.3d 1252, 1256 (10t ...