United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
QUENTIN A. QUINN, Petitioner,
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
case is before the Court on petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a
response in opposition. No reply was filed.
Quentin Quinn is an inmate at the Missouri Eastern
Correctional Center in Pacific, Missouri. In 2014, Quinn
pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery and making a
terroristic threat in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County,
Case No. 12SL-CR07988. The Circuit Court sentenced Quinn to
ten years' imprisonment. In his petition, Quinn raises
four grounds for federal habeas relief. This Court will
dismiss the petition for at least three reasons. First,
Quinn's petition is untimely, as it was filed well
outside of AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations.
Second, Quinn's grounds for relief are procedurally
defaulted because Quinn never filed for state post-conviction
relief and the time in which to do so has long since passed.
Third, none of Quinn's allegations state a claim for
federal habeas relief.
I. Quinn's petition is barred by AEDPA's
one-year statute of limitations.
Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act provides a one
year statute of limitations on petitions for writs of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1). Quinn was sentenced on October 20, 2011.
(Petition at 1). Quinn did not file his petition in this case
until December 23, 2016-more than two years after the statute
of limitations began to run. Quinn's petition is thus
untimely, and this Court will dismiss it on that basis alone.
See King v. Hobbs, 666 F.3d 1132 (8th
Cir. 2012) (rejecting federal habeas petition as untimely
Quinn's petition is barred by procedural
courts are entitled to the first opportunity to address and
correct alleged violations of the prisoner's federal
rights. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731
(1991) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1991)).
To preserve issues for federal habeas review, a prisoner must
fairly present his claims to state courts during direct
appeal or state post-conviction proceedings. Sweet v.
Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1149 (8th Cir. 1997). Here, Quinn
admits that he failed to appeal from his guilty plea or file
a motion for post-conviction relief under Missouri's Rule
24.035. (Petition at 2).
the petitioner fails to present his claims in state court, he
“‘forfeits his right to present his federal claim
through a federal habeas corpus petition, unless he can meet
strict cause and prejudice or actual innocence
standards.'” Greer v. Minnesota, 493 F.3d
952, 957 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Clemons v.
Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744, 750 (8th Cir. 2004)). Quinn does
not allege cause or prejudice or actual innocence to overcome
his procedural default. Because Quinn failed to seek relief
in state court, he has forfeited his right to present his
claims before this Court. This Court will deny the petition
as procedurally defaulted.
Quinn fails to allege a basis for federal habeas
petition, Quinn alleges four grounds for relief. Each ground
fails to state a claim on which federal habeas relief could
first claim, Quinn alleges that his plea counsel “never
presented [mental] disabilities.” To state a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, Quinn allege facts that
overcome “a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistances.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). Quinn's
allegations must show that counsel's conduct fell below
reasonable professional standards and “that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Id. at 694.
Quinn's first claim, he does not allege that counsel knew
about his previous mental disabilities or that Quinn's
mental issues would have provided a legal excuse that could
have changed the outcome of his guilty plea. Quinn had an
opportunity to address the Court at his guilty plea hearing,
and he could have told the Court about his history of mental
illness if he thought it was relevant to his guilty plea.
Additionally, Quinn does not allege that he was mentally
incompetent at the time of his plea or not guilty by reason
of insanity at the time of his crime. In fact, court records
show that Quinn provided an allocution at his guilty plea
hearings, suggesting that he was criminally responsible at
the time of the crime.
first claim does not allege facts that could show his plea
counsel acted unreasonably or that he was prejudiced by plea
counsel's actions. Accordingly, Quinn's ...