United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
KEITH L. GRIFFIN, Plaintiff,
DIRECTOR OF VATTEROTT, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CATHERINE D. PERRY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court upon the application of Keith L.
Griffin for leave to commence this action without payment of
the required filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Upon consideration of the financial information provided with
the application, the Court finds that the application is
financially unable to pay any portion of the fee. Therefore,
plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. After reviewing
plaintiff's complaint, however, this action will be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See
Fed.R.Civ.P.12(h)(3) and for maliciousness. See 28
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court is required to dismiss a
complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead
more than “legal conclusions” and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action [that are] supported by mere conclusory
statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim
for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of
misconduct.” Id. at 679. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. Id. at 679.
reviewing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the
Court accepts the well-pled facts as true. Furthermore, the
Court liberally construes the allegations.
seeks monetary damages in this action against defendants, the
Director of Vatterott and Michael Gans, the Clerk of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Plaintiff has failed to
state the grounds for filing the instant action in Federal
“Statement of Claim, ” plaintiff alleges that he
“graduated from law enforcement school” in 1988,
but his identification was stolen in 1990. He claims that he
was licensed to carry a firearm and graduated with a law
degree, but these licenses were also stolen.
states that he “wants to file a lawsuit against
[Vatterott] and punitive damages for attempts to disregard
[his] pending lawsuit for court on medical malpractice and a
tort claim.” Plaintiff states that he previously filed
a lawsuit and an appeal of the lawsuit in front of Judge
Limbaugh, but his case was dismissed. Plaintiff seeks a
“restraining order on Michael Gans” so he cannot
rule against him, as well as monetary damages in an amount of
$3.5 million dollars.
outset, the Court notes that even pro se litigants are
obligated to plead specific facts and proper jurisdiction and
must abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff
has failed to do so in this case. See U.S. v.
Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994); Boswell v.
Honorable Governor of Texas, 138 F.Supp.2d 782, 785
(N.D. Texas 2000); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (complaint should
contain “short and plaint statement” of claims);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(2) (each claim shall be “simple,
concise, and direct”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b) (parties are
to separate their claims within their pleadings “the
contents of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a
single set of circumstances”).
construing plaintiff's complaint as being brought under
28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court will dismiss the action,
without prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The amount in controversy is stated in a conclusory manner,
and plaintiff has insufficiently alleged diversity of
citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Furthermore,
the instant action does not appear to arise under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and
thus, federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 is inapplicable.
the Court believes this action to be malicious. The manifest
purpose of plaintiff's complaint does not appear to
rectify any cognizable harm, but only to harass and disparage
both Judge Limbaugh, who rendered a civil judgment against
him, and Michael Gans, who notified plaintiff that the Court
of Appeals ruled against him in a prior appellate action.
Title 28 Section 1915 not only allows, but expressly
requires, District Courts to dismiss malicious cases. This
case appears to fall directly within the statutory confines.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's
motion to proceed in forma ...