Court of Appeals of Missouri, Southern District, Second Division
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POLK COUNTY Honorable John C.
E. SCOTT, J.
Hagan challenges the overall property division and four
rulings as to specific property in the judgment dissolving
his marriage. We affirm.
and Marsha had been married more than 30 years when she
caught him in his second affair, this time with an
18-year-old employee of his bowling alley. Mark refused
Marsha's repeated requests to end the affair, so she
eventually moved out. The 18-year-old moved into the marital
home with Mark, where she still lived at the time of trial.
Marsha petitioned to dissolve the marriage, the court entered
an order requiring preservation of marital assets. Ignoring
this, Mark conveyed his bowling alley to his father's
trust without the consent of Marsha or the court or notifying
his own divorce lawyer. This was among Mark's several
"tomfooleries" (as the court called them elsewhere
on the record) cited in the final judgment:
[Mark] squandered, secreted and conveyed to others
(particularly his parents) significant assets that could have
been divided between the parties. These assets include,
without limitation, (a) a significant number of firearms that
[Mark] claims to have disposed of prior to separation, but
for which he was completely unable to present any evidence
supporting such dispositions, (b) a debt of $16, 500 owed to
the parties by Springfield Clutch & Gear, an entity
controlled by [Mark's] father, that [Mark] received
payment on but did not account for or share with [Marsha],
(c) a 2002 Polaris Camo 4-wheeler sold by [Mark] prior to
trial, and [Mark] retained all of the proceeds thereof
exclusively for himself, and (d) substantially all of the
assets of Buffalo Bowl & Arcade, L.C., an entity that
owned and operated a bowling alley business, which assets
were conveyed by [Mark] to his parents in February 2015,
without notice to [Marsha] or this Court, and without [Mark]
causing any appraisals or other valuations or due diligence
to have been conducted in order to determine the value of
such assets prior to conveying them.
actions, and the trial court's credibility
determinations, led to the court's stated intent to split
marital property "65/35" in Marsha's favor.
Ultimately, as calculated and reflected in the final
judgment, Marsha received 59.4% of the net marital estate.
points each criticize property classification, valuation, or
division. These are areas where the trial court enjoyed broad
discretion, so we will interfere only if the resulting
division was so one-sided as to show abuse of discretion,
which is Mark's burden to prove. See Landewee,
515 S.W.3d at 694.
more fundamentally, we can reverse this court-tried judgment
only if no substantial evidence supports it,
or it is against the weight of the evidence,
or it erroneously declares or applies the law.
Landewee, 515 S.W.3d at 694 (citing Murphy v.
Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)). These being
the only reasons to reverse any court-tried case,
each of Mark's points should specify some Murphy v.
Carron basis for relief. See Marriage of
Sivils, No. SD34633, slip op. at 11-13 (Mo.App. Sept.
12, 2017); Smith v. Great Am. Assur. Co., 436 S.W.3d
700, 703-04 & n.3 (Mo.App. 2014).
do, nor are they salvaged if we interpret them as
Murphy evidentiary challenges (the best
"fit" for each) because their supporting arguments
ignore Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178, 186-89
(Mo.App. 2010), and its progeny, rendering them analytically
useless, unpersuasive, and of no support for Mark's
challenges. See Sivils, slip op. at 12; Marriage
of Geske, 421 S.W.3d 490, 500-02 (Mo.App. 2013);
Houston, 317 S.W.3d at 188, 189.
could affirm the judgment on this basis alone, but will
briefly note other reasons to deny Mark's points, which
we take out of order for convenience.