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Doe v. United States

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division

September 11, 2017

JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Defendants.

          ORDER

          FERNANDO J. GAITAN, JR. United States District Judge

         Currently pending before the court is defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 34).

         I. BACKGROUND

         The Does' claims arise from an enforcement action filed by the Federal Trade Commission. Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), authorizes the FTC, through its attorneys to initiate federal court proceedings to enjoin violations and to secure equitable relief. In 2013, Helen Wong, an attorney with the FTC initiated an investigation into John Doe's employer. Based on the results of her investigation and as part of her official duties, Wong filed a complaint against Doe's employer and a number of its executives alleging violations of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act. John Doe was not named as a party, but was involved in the practices at issue and was deposed by the FTC. During the deposition, John Doe provided personally identifiable information (“PII”). In the course of her work on the case against the Does' employer, Wong prepared a reply brief in support of a motion for preliminary injunction. In his deposition, Doe testified to facts which supported the FTC's legal position. Thus, Wong decided to include portions of the deposition transcripts in her reply suggestions. Wong stated in her Affidavit that she instructed other employees of the FTC with whom she was working to redact any personal identifiable information contained in the exhibits. Wong states that the brief was filed under her ECF ID in the Court's filing system. Wong states in her affidavit that at the time the filing was complete, she believed that the exhibits contained only the redacted deposition transcript. However, approximately one hour after the reply suggestions had been filed, she learned that the unredacted transcripts had been inadvertently attached as exhibits to the preliminary injunction brief. In her affidavit, Wong states that she immediately tried to remove the documents, but was unable to do so. She left a voicemail on the After Hours Emergency number for the Western District of Missouri court. She also emailed the Western District of Missouri district court clerk and the FTC's Privacy Officer to inform them that two exhibits that contained the PII had been inadvertently filed on the court's ECF system. The exhibits were eventually placed under seal.

         Plaintiffs allege that the deposition, with the identifying information, was taken from the Court's electronic filing system and re-posted on the internet by third-parties. Plaintiffs allege that following the reposting, they have been the victims of a variety of attacks on their identities and physical threats have been made against them. On January 28, 2016, plaintiffs filed a Complaint stating that their dates of birth, address, driver's license numbers, marital status, emails and Mr. Doe's social security number were put into the public court record by the FTC. Plaintiffs sued the United States of America and Helen Wong, in her official capacity as legal counsel to the FTC. Plaintiffs state that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the privacy protections of the Constitution of the United States, the Privacy Act of 1974, 28 U.S.C.§ 552a, the Federal Tort Claims Act and the law of the State of Missouri. Plaintiffs asserted three counts in their initial Complaint: Count I - state law claim for Invasion of Privacy; Count II -Government Disclosure of Private Identifying Information and Count III - Constitutional Right to Privacy - Privacy Act. (Doc. # 1). The Government filed a motion to dismiss arguing that a Bivens claim may not be maintained against the United States or a government employee in their official capacity, the FTC attorney was not a proper defendant under the FTCA and the FTCA claim was barred by absolute immunity. The Government did not reference the Privacy Act, because although it was briefly mentioned, it did not believe that a claim had been asserted under that statute. In response, plaintiffs withdrew their Bivens claim and the Court dismissed the remaining claims. However, plaintiffs were given an opportunity to file an amended complaint with additional details regarding their Privacy Act claim. The plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on October 21, 2016. The Government now moves to dismiss the Privacy Act claim on the basis that plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that the FTC acted in an “intentional and willful” manner and also because plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that they have suffered actual damages.

         II. STANDARD

         To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A pleading that merely pleads “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation” of the elements of a cause of action, or “naked assertions” devoid of “further factual enhancement" will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) we must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and grant all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2005).

         III. DISCUSSION

         A. Have Plaintiffs Alleged Intentional and Willful Conduct?

         The Privacy Act states in part:

(b) Conditions of disclosure- No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains, [unless subject to certain exemptions, which are not relevant here].
(g)(1) Civil remedies. - Whenever an agency
(D) fails to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual, the individual may bring a civil action against the agency, and the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction in the matters under the provisions of this subsection.
(g)(4) In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable ...

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