United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
G FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the motion (ECF No. 9) of
Defendants Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Tyson”) and
Richard Riley (“Riley”) to dismiss
Plaintiff's employment discrimination complaint in part,
for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has not responded to the
motion, and the time to do so has passed. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court will grant Defendants' motion.
a former employee of Tyson, filed this lawsuit on February
16, 2017. She asserts claims against Tyson and Riley under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e, et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the
Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 213.010, et seq. Plaintiff's complaint
contains four counts: sex discrimination (Count I);
disability discrimination (Count II); retaliation (Count
III); and constructive discharge
IV). Each count references both federal and state law, and
each is asserted against both Defendants. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages.
complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she filed a charge of
discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights
(“MCHR”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on March 30, 2015, and
amended the charge on April 18, 2016. Plaintiff alleges that
the MCHR issued a Notice of Right to Sue on November 16,
2016, and the EEOC issued its Notice of Right to Sue on
December 27, 2016. Plaintiff attaches the administrative
charges and Notices of Right to Sue as exhibits to her
have moved to dismiss the MHRA claims against both Defendants
as untimely, having been filed more than 90 days after the
MCHR issued its Notice of Right to Sue. Defendants have also
moved to dismiss the Title VII and ADA claims against Riley
only, on the ground that these federal statutes do not impose
personal liability on individuals. Defendants have not sought
dismissal of the Title VII and ADA claims against Tyson.
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a
plaintiff's allegations must contain “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). The reviewing court must accept the plaintiff's
factual allegations as true and construe them in
plaintiff's favor, but it is not required to accept the
legal conclusions the plaintiff draws from the facts alleged.
Id. at 678; Retro Television Network, Inc. v.
Luken Commc'ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766, 768-69 (8th Cir.
MHRA provides that “[a]ny action brought in court under
this section shall be filed within ninety days from the date
of the commission's notification letter to the individual
but no later than two years after the alleged cause occurred
or its reasonable discovery by the alleged injured
party.” Mo. Rev. Stat § 213.111.1; see also
State, ex rel. Martin-Erb v. Mo. Comm'n on Human
Rights, 77 S.W.3d 600, 604 (Mo. 2002) (“The
complainant must file any civil action against the person or
entity allegedly committing the discrimination within 90 days
of the date of the MCHR's letter . . . .”).
Plaintiff did not file suit until February 16, 2017, 92 days
after the date of the MCHR's Notice of Right to Sue, and
she has not provided any explanation for the delay. Her MHRA
claims against both Defendants must be dismissed as untimely.
See Favaloro v. BJC Healthcare, No. 4:14-CV-284 CAS,
2015 WL 6531867, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2015) (dismissing
MHRA claim as untimely because it was filed 125 days after
the date of the MCHR's notice of right to sue);
Hammond v. Mun. Correction Inst., 117 S.W.3d 130,
138 (Mo.Ct.App. 2003) (“Statutes of limitations
contained in the Missouri Human Rights Act have been strictly
are also correct that “[i]t is well settled that Title
VII provides for claims only against an individual's
‘employer' and that individual coworkers,
supervisors and managers are not employers under the
statute.” Robinson v. N. Am. Sch. Bus, No.
4:16 CV 1576 RWS, 2017 WL 1477143, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 24,
2017); see also Roark v. City of Hazen, Ark., 189
F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[A] supervisor may not
be held liable under Title VII.”). Likewise,
“[a]lthough the Eighth Circuit has not addressed
whether individuals may be liable under Title I of the ADA,
this Court has stated its belief that the Eighth Circuit
would determine that suits may not be brought against
individual defendants under the ADA.”
Favaloro, 2015 WL 6531867, at *4 (collecting cases).
Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs Title VII and
ADA claims against Riley.
reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Defendants' partial motion ...