United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
L. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on the Petition of Jasmine
Jeffries for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The Petition is fully briefed and ready for
Jasmine Jeffries is currently incarcerated at the Women's
Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center located
in Vandalia, Missouri, pursuant to the judgment and sentence
of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri.
(Resp't's Ex. B pp. 10-13, ECF No. 5-2) Petitioner
pleaded guilty to one count of Assault in the First Degree,
and on September 2, 2011, the trial court sentenced her to 15
years' incarceration. (Id. at pp. 10-34)
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal from her conviction.
November 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a.pro se Motion
to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment or Sentence
pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 24.035. (Id.
at pp. 61-72) Appointed counsel filed an amended
post-conviction motion on or about February 14, 2012,
alleging, inter alia, that counsel failed to
adequately advise petitioner about the dangers of dual
representation or otherwise obtain consent to the dual
representation. (Id. at pp. 78-106) On July 19,
2012, the motion court denied Petitioner's motion for
Rule 24.035 post-conviction relief. (Id. at pp.
post-conviction appeal, Petitioner alleged that plea counsel
was ineffective for failing to adequately advise Petitioner
about the dangers of dual representation and thus failed to
obtain informed consent to the dual representation.
(Resp't's Ex. C, ECF No. 5-3) On September 17, 2013,
the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court's
judgment denying Petitioner's Rule 24.035 motion for
post-conviction relief. (Resp't's Ex. E, ECF No. 5-5)
The Missouri Court of Appeals issued its mandate on October
10, 2013. (Id. at pp. 15-16)
September 23, 2014, Petitioner filed the present petition for
habeas relief in federal court. (ECF No. 1) The record shows
that Petitioner mailed the petition on September 15, 2014.
(ECF No. 1 p. 14) Petitioner alleges one ground in her
petition, that trial counsel was ineffective due to a
conflict of interest in representing both Petitioner and a
asserts that Petitioner's habeas petition is untimely and
that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that equitable
tolling is warranted. Thus, Respondent argues that the Court
must dismiss the petition as untimely. Petitioner claims that
the statute of limitation should not apply because she
followed all the correct procedures and does not understand
the legal system.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA") established a one-year limitations period
for state prisoners to file federal habeas corpus
petitions." Bear v. Fayram, 650 F.3d 1120, 1122
(8th Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). This
one-year period begins to run from "the date on which
the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking such review."
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The limitations period is
tolled for "[t]he time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral
review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending-----" 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However,
'"the time between the date that direct review of a
conviction is completed and the date that an application for
state post-conviction relief is filed counts against the
one-year period.'" Bear v. Fayram, 650 F.3d
1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Painter v. Iowa,
247 F.3d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 2001)).
Respondent asserts that, because Petitioner did not file a
direct appeal, her time for filing a habeas petition began to
run ten days after her conviction. See Gonzales v.
Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012) (holding for
petitioners who do not pursue direct review, "the
judgment becomes final. . . when the time for pursuing direct
review ... in state court, expires"). Under Missouri
law, a conviction becomes final on the date of sentencing.
Rodgers v. Steele, No. 4:13CV2000 HEA, 2017 WL
445659, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 2, 2017) (citation omitted).
"Upon entry of a sentence, a party has ten days to file
a notice of appeal." Id. (citing Missouri
Supreme Court Rules 30.01, 30.03, 81.04).
sentencing date was September 2, 2011. Petitioner did not
file a direct appeal. Therefore, her time for pursuing direct
review expired ten days later on September 12, 2011, and the
one-year statute of limitations under the AEDPA began to run.
See Painter v. Iowa, 247 F.3d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.
2001) ("[T]he time between the date that direct review
of a conviction is completed and the date than an application
for state post-conviction relief is filed counts against the
one-year period."). Petitioner filed her pro se
motion for post-conviction relief 52 days later on November
3, 2011, tolling the limitation period. Petitioner then had
314 days remaining to file her habeas petition. The Missouri
Court of Appeals issued its Mandate affirming the denial of
Petitioner's Rule 24.035 motion on October 10, 2013.
Thus, Petitioner's habeas petition was due August 20,
2014. See Payne v. Kemna, 441 F.3d 570, 572 (8th
Cir. 2006) ("Under Missouri state court procedures,
[petitioner's] post-conviction relief proceedings were
not final until the issuance of the mandate . . . .").
Petitioner did not mail her habeas petition until September
15, 2014, 26 days after the petition was due. Thus, the Court
finds that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is
untimely. See Taylor v. Wallace, No. 4:13CV2197
SNLJ(ACL), 2017 WL 650599, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2017)
(finding habeas petition untimely where petitioner did not
file a direct appeal, causing the statute of limitations to
run 10 days later; the motion for post-conviction relief
tolled the limitations period until the issuance of the
mandate; and petitioner filed his federal habeas petition
four months past the time limit under the AEDPA).
Court notes that in some instances, the time period set forth
in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1) can be subject to equitable
tolling. "Under the doctrine of equitable tolling,
§ 2244(d) 's statutory limitations period may be
tolled if a petitioner can show that (1) he has been
diligently pursuing his rights and (2) an extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way. Id. (citing
Holland v. Florida,560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). Here,
Petitioner asserts in her Petition that the statute of
limitations should not apply to her because she does not know
a lot about the legal system. (ECF No. 1 p. 13) However,
"[e]ven in the case of an unrepresented prisoner
alleging a lack of legal knowledge or legal resources,
equitable tolling has not been warranted." Kreutze ...