United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CHARLES A. HAW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on remaining defendant Robert
Warner's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff
Benjamin William Wagner opposes the motion and it is fully
briefed. Warner moves for summary judgment on the merits and
on the basis of qualified immunity. For the following
reasons, the motion will be granted.
a prisoner at Farmington Correctional Center in Farmington,
Missouri, filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Warner, a Farmington functional unit manager. Plaintiff
alleges that when he was being moved to administrative
segregation on October 15, 2014, defendant Warner did not
allow him to take his legal materials along to administrative
segregation and instead had the materials placed in storage,
which caused plaintiff to miss a court deadline. On review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court found that
plaintiff stated a claim for denial of access to the courts.
standards applicable to summary judgment motions are well
settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a
court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the
information before the court shows “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
initial burden is placed on the moving party. City of Mt.
Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 838
F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988) (the moving party has the
burden of clearly establishing the non-existence of any
genuine issue of fact that is material to a judgment in its
favor). Once this burden is discharged, if the record shows
that no genuine dispute exists, the burden then shifts to the
non-moving party who must set forth affirmative evidence and
specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute on a
material factual issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on the
allegations in his pleadings, but by affidavit and other
evidence must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
Herring v. Canada Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026,
1029 (8th Cir. 2000); Allen v. Entergy Corp., 181
F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir. 1999). The non-moving party
“must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A dispute about a
material fact is “genuine” only “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Herring, 207
F.3d at 1029 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A party resisting
summary judgment has the burden to designate the specific
facts that create a triable question of fact, see
Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1114
(8th Cir. 2004), and “must substantiate allegations
with sufficient probative evidence that would permit a
finding in the plaintiff's favor.” Davidson
& Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir.
Court finds the following facts for purposes of summary
all times relevant to this action, defendant Warner was
employed by the Missouri Department of Corrections as the
Functional Unit Manager (“FUM”) of Housing Unit 7
at Farmington Correctional Center (“FCC”) in
Farmington Missouri. (Compl., p. 8; Warner Aff., Ex. A ¶
1; Pl. Dep., Ex. B, 12:22-24.)
all times relevant to this action, plaintiff Benjamin Wagner
(“plaintiff”) was an inmate incarcerated at FCC.
October 15, 2014, plaintiff was relocated from Housing Unit 7
and placed in administrative segregation in Housing Unit 5.
(Ex. A ¶ 2.)
During this relocation, plaintiff's property was packed
by Correctional Officer II Jesse McFall and plaintiff's
cellmate at the time, offender Randy Reagan. (Pl. Dep.
14:3-21; Ex. C.)
After plaintiff's property was searched, it was then
either taken to storage or to plaintiff's new cell in
administrative segregation. (Ex. A ¶ 4.)
Defendant Warner was not a property officer. (Pl. Dep.
Defendant did not pack plaintiff's property. (Pl. Dep.
14:3-21; Ex. A ¶ 5.)
Defendant Warner did not search, pack, or handle in any way
plaintiff's property during his move from Housing Unit 7
to Housing Unit 5. (Ex. A ¶ 5.)
Defendant Warner did not give any orders to any staff
regarding the disposition or storage of plaintiff's
property. (Ex. A ¶ 6.)
the FUM of Housing Unit 7, defendant Warner has no
possession, custody, or control over any property from
offenders housed in Housing Unit 5, such as the ...