United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
RICHARD WEBBER, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment [ECF No. 60] and Plaintiff Edwards
Terry's Motion for Subpoenas [ECF No. 46].
Edwards Terry (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint in
this Court on March 14, 2016. On April 4, 2016, Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint alleging Defendants Pamela Clark,
Darrick Honeywood, Luzella King, Timothy Mann and Russell
Roberts (“Defendants”) violated the Fourteenth
and Eighth Amendments of the United States Constitution by
not placing him in protective custody to prevent an assault
by another inmate. Defendants filed their Motion for Summary
Judgment asserting Plaintiff cannot establish Defendants were
aware of facts from which they could infer the existence of a
substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff, Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff did not file a
response to Defendants' Motion. The uncontroverted facts
are as follows.
was a pre-trial detainee at the Medium Security Institution
(“MSI”) in St. Louis Missouri, from December 8,
2015, to May 16, 2016, and from May 19, 2016, to August 25,
2016, when he was transferred to Jefferson County then
returned on October 14, 2016.Defendants are employees at MSI.
From January 13, 2016, to January 22, 2016, Plaintiff resided
in Dorm 1.
January 14, 2016, Defendant King called in reporting too sick
to work. On January 15, 2016, Defendant Roberts worked from
2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. in Pod 3. He would not have had any
interaction with inmates in Dorm 1. On January 17, 2016,
Defendant Mann worked from 2:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. On January
19, 2017, Defendant Honeywood was assigned to Pod 4, where he
would not have had any interaction with inmates in Dorm 1. On
January 20, 2016, Defendant Clark was not at work.
to January 21, 2016, Plaintiff did not tell Defendants
another inmate, Clemmins, threatened him. Defendants were
never aware of any threat made by inmate Clemmins to
Plaintiff. On January 21, 2016, Plaintiff was assaulted by a
fellow inmate. Plaintiff admits he does not know whether
Defendants actually inferred a substantial risk of serious
harm to him based on his alleged statements to Defendants.
about August 19, 2016, Constituency Services Unit
(“CSU”) officer Netsanet Newete received a
complaint from Plaintiff. In the complaint, Plaintiff
complained the Superintendant of MSI improperly took an extra
mattress prescribed to him by a doctor as a result of the
assault on January 21, 2016. The CSU officer voided the
complaint because Plaintiff was transferred to Jefferson
County, making the complaint moot. The Division of
Corrections has no record of any other complaints, informal
resolution requests, or grievances from Plaintiff mentioning
an assault on January 21, 2016.
shall grant a motion for summary judgment only if the moving
party shows “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). By
definition, material facts “might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law, ” and a genuine
dispute of material fact is one “such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). If the non-moving party has failed to “make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, . . . there can be
‘no genuine issue as to any material fact, ' since
a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element
of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
moving party bears the initial burden of proof in
establishing “the non-existence of any genuine issue of
fact that is material to a judgment in his favor.”
City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Co-op.,
Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 1988). If the moving
party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party must
then set forth affirmative evidence and specific facts
demonstrating a genuine dispute on the specific issue.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. When the burden shifts,
the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations in its
pleadings, but, by affidavit and other evidence, must set
forth specific facts showing a genuine dispute of material
fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); Stone Motor Co. v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 293 F.3d 456, 465 (8th Cir. 2002).
The non-moving party must demonstrate sufficient favorable
evidence that could enable a jury to return a verdict for it.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “If the non-moving
party fails to produce such evidence, summary judgment is
proper.” Olson v. Pennzoil Co., 943 F.2d 881,
883 (8th Cir. 1991).
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court may not
“weigh the evidence in the summary judgment record,
decide credibility questions, or determine the truth of any
factual issue.” Kampouris v. St. Louis Symphony
Soc., 210 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 2000). The Court
instead “perform[s] only a gatekeeper function of
determining whether there is evidence in the summary judgment
record generating a genuine issue of material fact for trial
on each essential element of a claim.” Id. The
Court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Reed v.
City of St. Charles, 561 F.3d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 2009).