United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
KRISTEN E. SCHALLON, Petitioner,
TERRY RUSSELL, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
L. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Petitioner Kristen E. Schallon
Petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus
By a Person in State Custody (ECF No. 1
("Motion")). Because this Court has determined that
Schallon's claims are inadequate on their face and the
record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon
which Schallon's claims are based, this Court decides
this matter without an evidentiary hearing.
Louis County jury found Schallon guilty of thirteen counts of
statutory sodomy, three counts of forcible rape, one count of
first-degree statutory rape, twelve counts of second-degree
statutory sodomy, and nine-counts of first-degree sexual
misconduct. (Respondent's Exhibit E, p. 1-2). The trial
court ordered all counts to run concurrently for a total of
thirty years' imprisonment in the Department of
September 11, 2014, Schallon filed this Motion seeking relief
based upon the following grounds:
(1) The trial court committed error when it denied
Schallon's motion for a mistrial;
(2) Schallon's appellate attorney was ineffective for
failing to raise some claims on appeal. Both claims were
presented to the Missouri Court of Appeals, which denied
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a district court "shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "[I]n a
§ 2254 habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court's
review of alleged due process violations stemming from a
state court conviction is narrow." Anderson v.
Goeke, 44 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 1995). "[A]n
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated
on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). '"A
state court's decision is contrary to ... clearly
established law if it applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it
confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision ... and
nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.'"
Cagle v. Norris, 474 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16
(2003)). The Supreme Court has emphasized the phrase
"Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, "
refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of
this Court's decisions, " and has cautioned that
§ 2254(d)(1) "restricts the source of clearly
established law to [the Supreme] Court's
jurisprudence." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. A
State court "unreasonably applies" federal law when
it "identifies the correct governing legal rule from
[the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it
to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case,
" or "unreasonably extends a legal principle from
[the Supreme Court's] precedent to a new context where it
should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that
principle to a new context where it should apply."
Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. A State court decision
may be considered an unreasonable determination "only if
it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct
factual findings do not enjoy support in the record."
Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2004)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
Denial of Motion for Mistrial
alleges that the trial court committed error by refusing to
grant his motion for a mistrial. (ECF No. 1 at 5). Schallon
contends that the mistrial should have been granted because
the state allegedly failed to comply with the discovery order
when it did not disclose an inculpatory statement made by
Schallon, and a witness testified about the statement at
Missouri Court of Appeals considered Schallon's argument
and denied relief holding:
In his first point on appeal, Schallon asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion in overruling his request for a
mistrial after Victim testified to an inculpatory statement
made by Schallon that was not disclosed to the defense. We
The decision whether to impose a sanction, including
mistrial, for noncompliance with discovery rules rest within
the "sound discretion" of the trial court.
State v. Wallace, 43 S.W.3d 398, 402 (Mo.App.
E.D.2001). We review atrial court's decision for abuse of
discretion, and will reverse only when there is a reasonable
likelihood that the discovery violation affected the result
of the trial. Id. at 402-03.
The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in denying
a mistrial, because there was no reasonable likelihood that
Victim's testimony affected the result of the trial.
Id. The court ordered the jury to disregard
Schallon's statement made during a confrontation with
Victim's boyfriend in which he suggested his guilt by
saying, "Please take a shot at me. I deserve it."
However, the record also included both Schallon's
confession of guilt to police, which was admitted without
objection, and a letter Schallon wrote to Victim in which he
apologized for his "inappropriate behavior."