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Barraza v. Magna International Inc.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division

June 30, 2017

JOSE BARRAZA, Plaintiff,


          FERNANDO J. GAITAN, JR. United States District Judge

         Currently pending before the Court is defendant Dieomatic Incorporated d/b/a LMV Automotive Systems[1] (“LMV's”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 9).

         I. BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination on April 11, 2016 with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights and the EEOC. In his Charge, plaintiff states that he was hired through a temporary agency to work with the defendant as a Quality Inspector. Plaintiff states that he started working on February 5, 2016 and throughout his tenure, he was subjected to harassment “because of my sex and/or my nonconformity to gender sterotypes.” Plaintiff states that he reported the harassment, but management failed to take immediate corrective action and because the work environment was so hostile, plaintiff states he was constructively discharged on March 11, 2016. Plaintiff also states that he believes “that Respondent discriminated against me because of my sex (male/gender non-conforming) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.” (Doc. No. 10-1). On the Charge of Discrimination Form, plaintiff check-marked the box that the discrimination was based on “Sex.” On April 15, 2016, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue letter. The letter stated that the EEOC was unable to conclude that the information obtained established a violation of the statute and that no finding is made as to any other issues that might be construed as having been raised by this charge. The letter goes on to state:

Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: This will be the only notice of dismissal and of your right to sue that we will send you. You may file a lawsuit against the respondent(s) under federal law based on this charge in federal or state court. Your lawsuit must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice; or your right to sue based on this charge will be lost. (The time limit for filing suit based on a claim under state law may be different).

         Ten days later, on April 25, 2016, the Missouri Commission on Human Rights issued a Notice of Right to Sue pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act. The letter informed plaintiff hat his complaint was dual-filed with the EEOC and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. The letter states that the MCHR has been informed that the EEOC has completed its processing of the complaint and has issued a notice of right to sue. The letter states that based on a review of the EEOC's investigation summary, the MCHR has decided to adopt the EEOC's findings, terminate the proceedings and issue this notice of right to sue on your claims under the MHRA. The letter informed plaintiff:

You are hereby notified that you have the right to bring a civil action within 90 days of the date of this letter against the respondent(s) named in the complaint. Such an action may be brought in any state circuit court in any county in which the unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred, either before a circuit or associate circuit judge. . . . As noted above, any action brought in court under this section must be filed within 90 days from the date of this letter and, in addition, any such case must be filed no later than two years after the alleged cause occurred or your reasonable discovery of the alleged cause. IF YOU DO NOT FILE A CIVIL ACTION IN STATE CIRCUIT COURT RELATING TO THE MATTERS ASSERTED IN YOUR COMPLAINT WITHIN 90 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, YOUR RIGHT TO SUE IS LOST.

(Doc. No. 5-2).

         Plaintiff filed his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this Court on July 25, 2016. Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on October 19, 2016 and the Complaint was filed the same day[2]. In his complaint, plaintiff marked that his lawsuit was based on Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act and a “belief that of which is transgenderism, retaliation.” In response to the question in the Employment Discrimination Complaint form which asked him to explain why he believes he was terminated, plaintiff checked the boxes for: religion, gender, disability and other - belief that of which is transgenderism. In an Exhibit attached to plaintiff's Complaint, plaint states at the top: “Violation of Title VII Civil Rights Act.” Then plaintiff proceeds to list all of the ways in which he believes defendant violated the statute and the effects that he has suffered as a result of these violations. Plaintiff then goes into an extensive thirteen page discussion explaining and detailing all of his allegations.

         Defendant has moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint as untimely filed and because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

         II. STANDARD

         To survive a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A pleading that merely pleads "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation" of the elements of a cause of action, or "naked assertions" devoid of "further factual enhancement" will not suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) we must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and grant all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2005).


         Defendant states that the Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue letter was signed by the EEOC's Area Office Director on April 15, 2016. Plaintiff is presumed to have received the letter within three days or by April 18, 2016. Adding ninety days to this date, plaintiff was required to have filed his Complaint on or before Monday July 18, 2016. As noted above, plaintiff did not file his Complaint with this Court until July 25, 2016, ...

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