United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
C. HAMILTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff
Rayfield Johnson, a detainee at the Sexual Offender
Rehabilitation and Treatment Services (“SORTS”)
facility, for leave to commence this action without
prepayment of the filing fee. (Docket No. 2). Having reviewed
the financial information provided with the motion, the Court
determines that plaintiff is financially unable to pay any
portion of the filing fee. The motion will therefore be
granted. In addition, the Court will dismiss the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Standard on Initial Review
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss
a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. To state a claim for relief under
§ 1983, a complaint must plead more than “legal
conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a
plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere
possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to,
inter alia, draw upon judicial experience and common
sense. Id. at 679.
conducting initial review pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the
Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal
construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). However, this does not mean that pro se
complaints may be merely conclusory. Even pro se
complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state
a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v.
Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see
also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir.
2004) (federal courts are not required to “assume facts
that are not alleged, just because an additional factual
allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In
addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit
of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules
in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to
excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See
McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
brings this action against Marty Marin-Forman, John
Lyskowski, Charlene Gilmore, Peggy Reed-Lohmeyer, and Jeffrey
S. Kline. He sues each defendant in an individual and
official capacity. Plaintiff states that the defendants
violated his civil rights by conspiring to put him in the
Missouri Sex Offender Treatment Program, make false
statements against him, illegally discharge him from Fulton
State Hospital with a “proper psychiatrist, ” and
prevent him access to news media outlets to tell his story.
(Docket No. 1 at 7). He seeks monetary relief, and also asks
the Court to intervene in some manner in a state court case.
complaint will be dismissed as factually frivolous under
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992). In
addition, plaintiff's official capacity claims are
subject to dismissal. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Plaintiff's
individual capacity claims will be dismissed because he fails
to allege how each defendant was directly involved in or
personally responsible for any alleged constitutional
violations. See Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203,
1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (liability under § 1983 requires a
causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged
deprivation of rights); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d
1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under §
1983 where plaintiff fails to allege defendant was personally
involved in or directly responsible for incidents that
injured him). Finally, the complaint does not state a claim
for conspiracy under § 1983 because plaintiff has not
plead factual detail indicating that any defendants conspired
either together or with others to deprive him of any
constitutional rights. See Burton v. St. Louis Bd. of
Police Com'rs., 731 F.3d 784, 798 (8th Cir. 2013).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(Docket No. 2) is GRANTED.
IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is
DISMISSED without prejudice. A separate
order of dismissal will be entered herewith.
IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to
appoint counsel (Docket No. 3) is DENIED as
IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this