United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
E. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
matter is before the Court on the motion of Michael Anthony
Jones to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. The United States has filed a
a jury trial, Jones was found guilty of possessing a firearm
as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(Count I); possession with intent to distribute and
manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) (Count II); possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count
III); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
(Count IV); and possession of methamphetamine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (Count V). Because of a criminal
information filed by the government pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 851(a)(1), Jones faced enhanced penalties as to Counts
II, III and V.
sentencing, the Court determined that Jones was an armed
career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) with respect
to Count I because of his two felony convictions for burglary
second degree, his conviction for burglary first degree and
his conviction assault first degree. His prior convictions
also qualified him as a career offender under U.S.S.G.
4B1.1(a) with respect to Counts II and III. Jones was
sentenced to concurrent terms of 360 months' imprisonment
for Counts I, II, III and V and a statutorily-mandated
consecutive 60-month term of imprisonment for Count IV.
motion, Jones seeks relief based on Mathis v. United
States, __U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604
(2016), in which the Supreme Court held that a prior
conviction does not qualify as the generic form of a
predicate violent felony listed in the Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), when the elements of the
statute on which the prior conviction is based are broader
than the elements of the generic form of the offense.
Mathis, 136 S, Ct. at 2257. In in
its response, the United States concedes that in light of the
Mathis decision, Jones' second degree burglary
convictions do not qualify as generic burglary under the ACCA
and that Jones is no longer an armed career criminal.
Consequently, the mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years'
imprisonment under § 924(e)(1) no longer applies.
Instead, the maximum sentence of imprisonment for the felon
in possession offense in Count I is ten years. 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(2). Jones must be re-sentenced on Count I
because the 360-month sentence he received exceeds the
ten-year statutory maximum for the offense.
Mathis involved the ACCA, the decision has no
application to the sentences of imprisonment Jones received
on the remaining counts. As discussed above, Jones was
designated a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a) with
respect to the drug offenses in Counts II and III. Section
4B1.1(a) provides that a defendant is a career offender if
(1) he was at least 18 years old when he committed the
offense of conviction; (2) the offense of conviction is
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense;
and (3) he has at least two prior felony convictions for
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
As relevant here, the term “crime of violence” in
U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a) is defined as a felony offense that
“has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another” or that is murder, voluntary manslaughter,
kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense,
robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession
of a firearm as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or
explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).
Johnson v. United States, __U.S.__, 135 S.Ct. 2551,
192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), the Supreme Court held that the
residual clause of the ACCA, which defined “violent
felony” as an offense that “otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another, ” was unconstitutional. The decision
in Johnson is inapplicable in this case, because the
Supreme Court has held that the Sentencing Guidelines are not
subject to a void-for-vagueness challenge under the Due
Process Clause and, more specifically, that the “crime
of violence” clause of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) is not void
for vagueness. Beckles v. United States, __ U.S. __,
137 S.Ct. 886, 895 (2017). Further, the sentencing
enhancements based of 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) and the minimum
consecutive sentence mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
are unaffected by the Johnson decision. Accordingly,
Jones is not entitled to be re-sentenced on Counts II through
reasons set forth above, the judgment entered on Count I will
be vacated, and Jones will be re-sentenced on that count
without application of the ACCA.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of Michael Anthony Jones
to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence [Doc. # 1] is
granted in part and denied in part.
FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Memorandum and Order
shall be filed in the underlying criminal case, United
States v. ...