United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
CATHERINE D. PERRY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Marlyn Young proceeds in this action pro se,
claiming that defendant Lowes Home Centers LLC violated the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§
1681, et seq.; the Credit CARD Act, Pub. L. No.
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009); and the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act (MMPA), Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010,
et seq., by maintaining and reporting improper
information in his credit accounts, and failing to take
corrective action upon receiving notice of
inaccuracies. Lowes now seeks to dismiss Young's
complaint in its entirety, arguing that it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. For the following
reasons, I will grant the motion in part and deny it in
seeks to dismiss Young's complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. When reviewing a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, I assume the allegations in the
complaint to be true and construe the complaint in
plaintiff's favor. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007); Huggins v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 862 (8th
Cir. 2010); Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire
Prot. Dist., 978 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1021 (E.D. Mo. 2013). I
give liberal construction to a pro se complaint,
which means that “if the essence of an allegation is
discernible, ” I should construe the complaint in a way
“that permits the layperson's claim to be
considered within the proper legal framework.”
Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To survive a
motion to dismiss, the complaint need not contain
“detailed factual allegations, ” but it must
contain facts with enough specificity “to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The issue in determining a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to
present evidence in support of the claim. See Skinner v.
Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529-30 (2011) (quoting
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
acting in its capacity as a retail credit card company,
entered and maintained credit information on an account of
Young's that was time-barred under an unspecified statute
of limitations. Lowes also maintained a credit entry on
Young's account with an improper balance and imposed a
rate increase without sixty days' notice to Young. Young
learned of these occurrences upon review of his credit report
in April 2016. Young, “in conjunction with” the
credit bureaus, requested Lowes to correct the misinformation
that was contained in his credit file, but Lowes has not
taken any corrective action.
argues that Young has failed to state a claim under any of
the statutes invoked in this action. Upon review of
Young's pro se complaint and according it
liberal construction as I must, I find that Young has stated
a claim under the FCRA, and specifically 15 U.S.C. §
1681s-2(b), and the motion to dismiss will be denied as to
that claim. I will grant the motion to dismiss in all other
contends that Young's FCRA claim fails because, to the
extent his complaint can be read to invoke 15 U.S.C. §
1681s-2(a), Young lacks a private right of action; and, to
the extent the complaint can be read to invoke 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681s-2(b), Young fails to allege that Lowes received
notice of any dispute from a consumer reporting agency.
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a), furnishers of information
relating to a consumer to a consumer reporting agency (CRA)
have a duty to provide accurate information. A consumer does
not have a private right of action, however, to enforce
§ 1681s-2(a). 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(d). Instead,
enforcement of § 1681s-2(a) is limited to federal and
state agencies and officials. Id. Because Young
cannot bring a private action against Lowes under §
1681s-2(a), his FCRA claim will be dismissed to the extent he
seeks to invoke § 1681s-2(a).
an individual may bring a private action against a furnisher
under § 1681s-2(b) for failing to meet certain duties
imposed upon furnishers after they receive notice of a
dispute from a CRA. Drew v. Capital One Bank (USA)
N.A., No. 1:16CV00095 SNLJ, 2016 WL 3402540, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. June 21, 2016). For these duties to be triggered, and
thus for a cause of action to accrue, the furnisher must have
received notice from a CRA that the credit information is in
dispute. Somlar v. Nelnet Inc., No.
4:16-CV-01037-AGF, 2017 WL 35703, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 4,
2017). Notice of disputed information provided only by the
consumer to a furnisher does not trigger the duties imposed
by § 1681s-2(b). Id.
Young has pled sufficient facts to invoke § 1681s-2(b).
A reading of Young's complaint in its entirety shows it
to adequately assert that Lowes is a “furnisher of
information” under the statute, given Young's claim
that he became aware of the allegedly inaccurate information
furnished by Lowes through his review of credit reports
provided to him by credit bureaus. In addition, to the extent
Lowes contends that Young fails to allege that it received
notice of disputed information from a CRA rather than from
Young himself, a plain reading of the complaint shows the
contrary. Young specifically pleads that he, “in
conjunction with all three credit bureaus, ”
requested that Lowes take corrective action but that Lowes
refused. (Petn., ECF #5 at p. 2.) This factual averment is
sufficient to allege that the credit bureaus provided notice
to Lowes of Young's dispute. Because the essence of a
claim under § 1681s-2(b) is discernible from the facts
alleged in Young's complaint, I will consider the claim
to be within the proper legal framework and permit it to go